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INTRODUCTION
The stalwart second chance is an American institution within
which we embed visions of our best future-selves. Americans believe
they can and should strive further,' that failures of the fathers need
not be indelible, and that each of us, at any time, can change and be-
come better than we were before. We believe in redemption.3 Our
t A.B. 1992, University of California at Berkeley;J.D. Candidate 2001, University of
Pennsylvania Law School. I want to thank Professor Michael Moore for his encour-
agement and guidance on early drafts, my excellent Comment Editors Janice Cater
and Garrett Broadrup, my superb Executive Editor Jennifer Zepralka, and, for much-
needed help in researching the psychology of guilt and remorse, my friend Joe Wall-
ing,
Since the beginning of the republic observers have commented that Americans,
rich and poor, continually seek upward mobility. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRAC' IN AMERICA 214 (Richard D. Heffner ed., Mentor 1956) (1835) (indicat-
ing that the rich and the poor both desire to expand their wealth).
, This kind of irrepressible American optimism, "the conviction that every-
one ... is a work in progress, able to change for the better," is a notion often articu-
lated by the most successful of our nation's citizens. Barbara Allen Babcock & Thomas
C. Grey, Tribute: Paul Brest, 52 STAN. L. REv. 261, 265 (2000) (conveying the lifelong
philosophy of Paul Brest, the former dean of the Stanford Law School); see also DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 157 ("Although man has many points of resemblance
with the brutes, one trait is peculiar to himself,-he improves .... The idea of per-
fectibility is therefore as old as the world .. ").
' See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 158 ("Thus, forever seeking, forever falling
to rise again,--often disappointed, but not discouraged,-[mankind] tends unceas-
ingly towards that unmeasured greatness so indistinctly visible at the end of the long
track which humanity has yet to tread."); SALVATORE R. MADDI, PERSONALITY
THEORIES: A COMPARATIvE ANALssis 56 (5th ed. 1989) (indicating that Freud "pres-
ents humans as fallible but also perfectible, a position deeply rooted in Western
thought and religion").
(1115)
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economic and social institutions reward it.4 But ours is also a nation
invested in the philosophy of personal responsibility. The criminal
law, for example, is an expression of our taking seriously the choices
that individuals make, even if those choices are bad ones, based on ill-
founded knowledge or derived from questionable thought processes.
Between these two values-the possibility of a second chance and the
demands of taking the first-time-around choice seriously-is typically
strung an enormous tension.5 This tension is especially acute in the
application of capital punishment. Here we must ask ourselves: are
there occasions when justice is best served by weighing the value of
personal responsibility against the vying value of human transforma-
tion and, as a result, commuting death sentences where desert is
blunted by repentance? Or, at least at first, that seems like the right
question to ask. But the ostensible tension between the first and sec-
ond chance may turn out, in special cases, to be largely overestimated.
Another way to look at the second chance is not as violative of the no-
tions of personal accountability, but rather, when properly taken ad-
vantage of, as allowing for a deep acknowledgment of one's failures
and an even deeper expression of personal responsibility for one's
bad acts through the endeavor of making wrongs right.
The broadest possible articulation of this sentiment would seek to
downgrade all corporal punishment where the wrongdoer has trans-
formed his7 character, regardless of his crime. But, for reasons more
4 As a reflection of the importance of the endless American expectation of the ris-
ing lower and middle classes, the media is often fixated on issues concerning the aver-
age standard of living and the disparities between the rich and poor. See, e.g.,Jacob NI.
Schlesinger et al., Charting the Pain Behind the Gain, WALL ST.J., Oct. 1, 1999, at BI (re-
lating that the Census Bureau reported a modest drop in poverty over the last decade
but a widening of the gap between the haves and have-nots).
5 "In the United States, humanistic tenets have long vied with belief in social Dar-
winism and individual responsibility, one or the other gaining an edge at any given
point." CANDACE CLARK, MISERY AND COMPANY: SYMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 15
(1997).
6 In this piece I use the term "corporal punishment" to mean "punishment that is
inflicted upon the body.., including imprisonment," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1247
(7th ed. 1999), but not including capital punishment. In all cases I mean to distin-
guish corporal punishment, or bodily imprisonment, from capital punishment, or
death through "state-imposed" execution. Id. at 407.
7 I have chosen to use male pronouns to refer to "human kind" because the subject
of this paper, the death penalty, disproportionately afflicts males. See RANDALL COYNE
& LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (Supp. 1996-
1997) ("Of the 3122 [death-sentenced] inmates known to [the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund] as of April 30, 1996, 3073 (98.4%) are men and 49 (1.60%) are women."); see
alsoJohn Monahan, Causes of Violence, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 17, 18 (Leo
Katz et al. eds., 1999) (indicating that close to 90% of people arrested for violent
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clearly laid out below, this is not my argument." The focus here is ex-
clusively on capital sentencing, as affected by its justifying agent, the
theory of retributivejustice. If character transformation is to effectu-
ate a downward departure in death sentencing it must do so within
the context of a theory of punishment that recognizes such a trans-
formation and understands its meaning. Moreover, any honest at-
tempt to dejustify the death penalty-not in general, but in a particu-
lar instance-must occur within the context of the theory of
punishment that justifies the penalty to begin with. Fortunately, these
two elements, recognizing character analysis and dejustifying capital
punishment, coalesce in a single background theory: retributivism.9
Retributivism, and specifically character retributivism, unlike other
theories of punishment, must necessarily recognize the positive effects
of an ethical transformation. And the death penalty is unique among
criminal penalties in that it most clearly finds its justification, presum-
ing it can be found anywhere, within a retributive scheme.' American
values stand in opposition to the categorical denial of redemption,"
and the broader claim that transformation can downgrade almost any
sentence, capital or not, is defensible, but by narrowing the focus to
capital sentences, the argument can be made more clearly and much
more persuasively.
The structure of this Comment is as follows. Part I erects a skele-
tal review of retributive justice in general and a defense of character
crimes are male and that such number has held steady for as long as records have been
kept).
Infra Part III.D.
After a long slumber, retributivism has enjoyed a renaissance in the last few dec-
ades. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punish-
ment, 74 CORNELL L. RE. 655, 656 (1989) (discussing rekindled interest in the retribu-
tive theory ofjustice). See generally, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
416 (1978) (noting rekindled interest in retributive theories of punishment); JOHN
KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973) (discussing approaches to punishment in-
cluding retributixism); RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON
EQUALITY & DESERT (1979); ANDREW VON HIRscH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS (1976) (documenting a study considering the future of an offender af-
ter conviction);J.B. Cederblom, Introduction to JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT I (J.B. Ced-
erblom & William L. Blizek eds., 1977) (commenting on the "revival of retributivism");
Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of DoingJustice, 1976
Wis. L. REV. 781 (exploring the recent shift towards retributivism); J.D. Mabbott, Pun-
ishment, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPEcTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 165 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed.,
1972) (defending the retributive theory of punishment).
See infta Part I.C.
I Since the beginning of Western philosophy, the project of ethical human behav-
ior has been inspired by "man's longing for salvation." LEON GRINBERG, GUILT AND
DEPRESSION 29 (Christine Trollope trans., 1992).
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retributivism specifically. It is the theory within which the Supreme
Court and the public have embedded justifications for capital pun-
ishment and the only theory that sufficiently accords our intuitions
with the law. Part H defines and explains the agents of change. Guilt,
remorse, and penance (the "trilogy") are important emotional and
normative mechanisms through which desert is either exhausted or
bartered away and through which wrongdoers alter their central char-
acter. Part III is the heart of the argument: the Transformation The-
sis argues for the dejustification of the death penalty under conditions
when the trilogy changes the prisoner's character from empty and
hollow to compassionate and empathic. Part IV argues for a legal ap-
plication of the Transformation Thesis. Under the Eighth Amend-
ment's proportionality doctrine, the transformed wrongdoer may have
a controversial and untested constitutional right to habeas corpus re-
lief. If not, an administrative solution is proposed to guarantee that
only those deserving of capital punishment would, in fact, receive it.
It should be made clear up front what this Comment is not about.
It is not about mercy. Alwynne Smart observes that there are two con-
ceptions of mercy.12 The first way to think about mercy is as a pressure
release valve that helps to "avoid an unduly harsh penalty," in other
words, "to avoid an injustice." 3 This notion of mercy has been right-
14fully criticized as no mercy at all. Doing justice does not mercy
make. The second way to think about mercy is as the benevolent en-
forcement of "less than the deserved punishment."  This is more
likely what we mean by mercy, and it is a notion not addressed here.'
12 Alwynne Smart, Mercy, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: A COLLECTION OF
PAPERS 212, 227 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969).
13 Id.
14 See Malla Pollack, The Under Funded Death Penalty: Mercy As Discrimination in a
Rights-Based System ofJustice, 66 UMKC L. REV. 513, 518-19 (1998) (arguing that Smart's
first conception of mercy is merely justice in disguise).
15 Smart, supra note 12, at 227; see also Andrew Brien, Mery, Utilitarianism and Re-
tributivism, 24 PHILOSOPHIA 493, 503 (1994) (explaining that mercy involves people
"receiving something less" than what they deserve); Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81 PHIL.
REV. 182, 187 (1972) ("An offender is shown mercy when the penalty which he de-
serves for his offense, or which others have the right to impose for it, is reduced or
suspended or waived .. ").
"b This articulation of mercy implicates an old issue that I do not intend to solve
here:
Mercy is a virtue. Justice is a virtue. Justice involves giving persons in rele-
vantly similar situations like punishments (or rewards). Mercy involves chang-
ing (tempering) the results reached through justice. Mercy must, therefore,
be unjust or a subset of justice. Mercy, however, cannot be justice: justice is
obligatory and requires equal treatment of like cases; mercy is supererogatory
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This Comment does not argue for giving a wrongdoer anything ex-
cept what he deserves. In discussing our response to remorse and
ethical transformation, it should become clear why we have a duty un-
der retributive justice, not soft-hearted, ungrounded absolution, to
mitigate a sentence of death under certain special circumstances. A
preliminary review of retributive justice will help us to better under-
stand the terms of the debate and provide grounding for the Trans-
formation Thesis.
I. RETRIBUTwEJUSTICE
A. Moorean Theory and Negative Retributivism
Retributive justice is the theory that offenders should be punished
"because and only because" they deserve punishment.17 The "correct"
amount of punishment is that amount commensurate or "equal" to
the "moral seriousness of the offense."' s Punishing wrongdoers may
have certain side effects, such as provoking or deterring other crimi-
nal acts, but for the retributivist these effects are reasons for neither
abstaining from nor applying punishment." Punishing those who de-
serve it is an intrinsic good, a good in and of itself.
2
Michael Moore helps to put a finer point on retributive theory by
delineating what it is not.2 ' First, retributivism does not necessarily
commit itself to lex talionis, or punishment meted out under the prin-
ciple of requiring the blinding of those who wrongfully blind others.2
Neither does retributive justice necessarily mandate capital sentences:
"It is quite possible," argues Moore, "to be a retributivist and to be
and cannot, therefore, require anything.
Pollack, supra note 14, at 516.
' MICtEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
153 (1997).
" Louis P. POJMAN & JEFFERY REIMAN, THE DEATH PENALTY: FOR AND AGAINST 9
(1998).
"' See MOoRE, supra note 17, at 153 (explaining that the collateral effects of pun-
ishment do not make the application of punishmentjust under a retributivist view).
" See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 231 (5th ed. 1984)
("[S]uffering for moral evil voluntarily done, is itselfjust or morally good."); MOORE,
supra note 17, at 87-88 (explaining that whereas punishment is an instrumental good
under utilitarian theories, for retributivism the application of deserved punishment is
intrinsically good).
" MOORE, supra note 17, at 88-91 (explaining qualities of punishment that are
wrongfully identified as being retributivist).
" &w id. at 88 (arguing that retributivism is not itself an argument for a particular
kind of desert).
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against both the death penalty and lex talionis."5 Why? Because to say
that some punishment is deserved does not establish what kind of
punishment is appropriate.
Second, Moore explains that retributivism is not the view that
punishment is justified where it quenches victims' vengeful impulses,
suppresses vigilantism, or otherwise satisfies the preferences of citizens
24at large. The retributivist does not mind these kinds of socially use-
ful side effects leeching from desert-based punishment, but they can-
not be original justifications.2 Nor is retributivism to be "confused
with [a] denunciatory theor[y]" that justifies punishment "by the
good consequences it achieves-either... psychological satisfac-
tions,.., the prevention of private violence, or the prevention of fu-
ture crimes through the educational benefits of such denunciation."" '
Third, retributive justice does not dictate the shape of formal jus-
tice, or the principle of "treating... like cases alike."2 7 Just because I
am to be punished according to my desert, it does not follow that I
should also be punished in a way and to the extent others in my pre-
dicament were punished in the past. Others like me may have acci-
dentally been punished too lightly, or too harshly, in which case my
punishment, were it to follow theirs, would clash with my desert."
"Equality," argues a noted death penalty theorist, "seems morally less
important than justice.... Justice requires that as many of the guilty
as possible be punished, regardless of whether others have avoided
punishment."
2 9
3 Id.
24 See id. at 89-90 (distinguishing instrumental goods from desert).
SeeJ.D. Mabbott, Punishment, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 39, 40 (H.B.
Acton ed., 1969) ("The truth is that while punishing a man and punishing him justly, it
is possible to deter others, and also to attempt to reform him, and if these additional
goods are achieved the total state of affhirs is better than it would be with the just pun-
ishment alone.").
26 MOORE, supra note 17, at 90. But seeJoel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Pun-
ishment, 49 MONIST 397, 397-423 (1965) (defending the denunciatory view of retribu-
tivejustice).
MOORE, supra note 17, at 90-91. But see H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Ap-
proach to Punishment, 8 INQUIRY 249, 260 (1965) (arguing that retributivism is a "par-
ticular application of a general principle of justice, namely, that equals should be
treated equally and unequals unequally").
" This is true even in the context of capital punishment. Scott W. Howe, The Failed
Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing Tria4 146 U. PA. L. REV.
795, 826 (1998) (arguing that in the context of capital punishment "the offender who
warrants the death penalty and receives it does not warrant the penalty any less be-
cause some others who also warrant the death sentence escape it").
Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1662,
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Last, unlike Moore, 3" I will adopt a negative retributive theory:3'
the guilty and only the guilty should be punished. Negative retribu-
tivism is a fuller account of punishment than Moore's alone, because
it tells us how to treat not only the guilty, but the innocent as well.
Retributivism has been criticized as a notion too broad to be
meaningful. Of course we should punish those who deserve punish-
ment, but how do we know who deserves what? Without an explana-
tion of desert, retributivism begins to resemble a mere tautology.
A death-penalty-focused desert analysis will often display at least
five broad characteristics. First, desert presumes a moral universe in
which individuals have a genuine opportunity to choose for them-
selves various courses of action33 and consequently reap the benefits or
detriments of that choice.m Second, as Moore explains, culpable
wrongdoing powers desert.' Wrongdoing has a physical,3" as well as a
1663 (1986).
' See MOORE, supra note 17, at 88-89 (distinguishing negative retributiism from
retributivism simpliciter).
" John L. Mackie, Retributivism: A Test Casefor Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY OF
LaW 677, 677-84 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 4th ed. 1991); see alsoJohn L.
Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1982,
at 3, 4 (observing that the principle of negative retributihism is "widely, perhaps uni-
versally, felt to have ... an immediate appeal").
" See POJMAN & REIMAN, supra note 18, at 9 (1998) (arguing that the traditional
retributivist position requires that only the guilty be punished); A.M. Quinton, On Pun-
ishment, 14 ANALYSIS 133, 135-36 (1953) (arguing "that only the guilty are to be pun-
ished and that the guilty are always to be punished").
" See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 93 (1989) [hereinafter DEAN MOORE] ("A retributivist believes that there are
genuine choices present in the world, that people can rationally choose among them,
that people are capable of acting on their choices.").
See NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY
VALUES 154 (1988) (explaining that retributive justice is grounded in liberal notions of
autonomy and choice and that radical retributivism views the wrongdoer as not only
deserving punishment, but having a right to be punished); POjMAN & REIMAN, supra
note 18, at 13 ("Those who sow good deeds would reap good results, and those who
choose to sow their wild oats would reap accordingly."); see also TOM SORELL, MORAL
THEORY AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 147-48 (1987) (noting some difficulties with more
radical notions of free will, but concluding that at the very least we will to be free).
John Rawls has criticized the "as you sow so shall you reap" notion of desert by arguing
that to the extent that none of us are responsible for our natural endowments, pro-
cliities, and inclinations, having no part in choosing our parents, our bodies, intellect,
or character, we cannot be held responsible for the good or bad outcomes of our acts.
JOHN R"%WLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 65, 86-93 (rev. ed. 1999).
' MOORE, supra note 17, at 168 ("To say that a person deserves punishment is to
say that he has culpably done wrong.. ").
Professor Leo Katz explains, "one of the most basic rules of the criminal law" is
that "[olne is liable for [one's] acts." LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTrEN GAINS: EvAsION,
BLACK\AIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAw 208 (1996).
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mental, component" One must have done the wrong in a particular
state of mind38 Third, desert for a retributivist is an objective notion.'
No normative authority inheres in mere subjective claims that we can
and should punish wrongdoers or that wrongdoers are required to
submit to punishment simply because the majority wills it.4 0  The
fourth is a related point, namely, desert has qualities of a right.4' The
state has a right to punish those who deserve punishment and, con-
versely, those who deserve punishment are obligated to submit.
42
Fifth, punishment is proportional to desert, and desert is proportional
to the severity of the wrong committed.45  The more evil the act, the
31 See id. at 213 (indicating that a crime "can be committed intentionally, know-
ingly, recklessly, or negligently").
See id. (indicating that the bad act must include an aspect of culpability).
'9 See POJMAN & REIMAN, supra note 18, at 13 (describing the concept of desert as
presuming an "objective morality"). Moore, a staunch retributivist, has written exten-
sively on the objective quality of "moral reality." Michael Moore, Moral Realiy, 1982
WTIs. L. REV. 1061, 1154-56; Michael S. Moore, Good Without God, in NATURAL Lx W,
LIBERALISM, AND MORALrn: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 221 (Robert P. George ed., 1996);
Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424, 2460 (1992).
Absent independent truth to the desert claim, the state's assertions of right be-
come mere tyrannical force. In this way, under Lockean theory, a claim of desert may
be thought of much like a claim of right. Where the state diverges from the natural
law-an objective force-in applying punishment or in any other respect, it, by defini-
tion, engages in tyranny and thus "may be opposed as any other man who by force in-
vades the right of another." JOHN LOcKE, THE SEcOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 101
(J.W. Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 3d ed. 1976) (1690).
'I John Locke found two fundamental qualities emanating from the "law of na-
ture"-duties and liberties. Id. at 4-5 ("But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not
a state of license .... "). Some believe that Locke emphasizes natural liberties over
"natural duties or obligations." LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 226-28
(1953). Others have advanced the opposite: "Law and duty, not right, is the founda-
tion of Locke's ethics." David Gauthier, Why Ought One Obey God? Reflections on Hobbes
and Locke, 7 CANADIANJ. PHIL. 425, 432 (1977). But the most plausible view marries
the two aspects, liberties and duties. E.g., Knud Haakonssen, Divine/Natural Law Theo-
ries in Ethics, in 2 THE CA2,1BRIDGE HISTORY OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY
1317, 1348 (Daniel Garber & Michael Ayers eds., 1998) ("[N]atural rights are powers
to fulfil the basic duty of natural law." (emphasis added)). Duties and liberties are the
two key qualities of any right.
41 See MOORE, supra note 17, at 154 ("[Olfficials have a duty to punish deserving
offenders and.., citizens have a duty to set up and support institutions that achieve
such punishments."); K.G. Armstrong, The Right to Punish, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 136, 136 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972) (indicating that
retributive justice "gives the appropriate authority the right to punish offenders"); see
also David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 542 (1991)
(naming "bold retributivism" as the punishment-obligating theory and contrasting
"modest retributivism," which only allows the state to punish). But see POJMAN &
REIMAN, supra note 18, at 92 (arguing that it is the victim who holds the right to pun-
ish).
43 See POJMAN & REIMAN, supra note 18, at 15 (arguing that the original action is
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more intense the desert. The more intense the desert, the more
egregious the punishment." Much of the following discussion hinges
upon this fifth general characteristic. As argued at length below, the
proportionality aspect of desert mandates mitigating punishment
when a wrongdoer undergoes an authentic character transformation.
This is because character affects desert, and as the wrongdoer changes
his character he necessarily changes the punishment he is owed.
B. Character Retributivism
Jeffrie Murphy explains that retributivism is the theory of punish-
ment that confers upon wrongdoers what they deserve. He identifies
at least five senses of desert, and thus at least five basic kinds of re-
tributive justice: "desert as legal guilt; desert as involving mens rea... ;
desert as involving responsibility... ; desert as a debt owed to annul
wrongful gains from unfair free-riding (the Herbert Morris theory);
and, finally, desert as involving ultimate character-evil or wickedness
in some deep sense."" ' Murphy states that an analysis of desert em-
bodied in the ultimate character of the wrongdoer is called character
retributivism.1 ' Immanuel Kant, Michael Moore, and even Murphy
himself have sustained and defended this view.f Character retributiv-
the basis of evaluating the appropriate measure of desert); Nathan Brett, Mercy and
CriminalJmfirc.: A Plea for Mercy, 5 CANADIANJ.L. JURISPRUDENCE 81, 90 (1992) (indi-
cating that Canada has formally recognized proportionality as a crucial element of de-
sert). Kant understood that punishment was context-sensitive and agent-relative.
IMNL\NUEL K- NT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 141-42 (Mary Gregor trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797). A rich man, for example, is often poorly punished by
a pecuniary fine, but might be more effectively retributed through public humiliation.
Id.; we' RALPH D. ELLIS & CAROL S. ELLIS, THEORIES OF CRIMINALJUSTICE: A CRITICAL
REAPPRAISAL 71 (1989) (discussing prorating punishment).
" For a discussion of the difference between ordinal and cardinal proportionality
in desert theory, see Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing Aims, Principles, and Policies, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL Likw 333, 342 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999). See also DEAN
MOORE, supra note 33, at 98 (arguing that under proportionality, pardons are appro-
priate when "the offender has already suffered enough[,] ... the offender stands to
suffer too much because of special circumstances[, or] to relieve any punishment that
is too severe").
". Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemology, the Retributive Emotions, and the "Clumsy
Moral Philosophy" ofJesus Christ, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 149, 153 (Susan A. Bandes ed.,
1999).
"' For a detailed comparison between character retributivism and Herbert Morris's
theory, see generally Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, Punishment and Mercy, in
REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIvE PERSPECTIVE 143 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney
eds., 1997).
" Se ' Murphy, supra note 45, at 153 (explaining that Kant defends character re-
tributivism in The Metaphysics of Morals, Moore defends it in Placing Blame, and that the
author himself has defended the view in Forgiveness and Mercy); see also KANT, supra note
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ism, the notion that wrongdoers should be punished in proportion to
their own inner wickedness, may be thought of as the kind of punish-
ment "that God might properly administer, on that final Day ofJudg-
ment" 4 8 This particular strain of punishment is well known in the
prosecution of capital crimes. Murphy writes:
In many American states, for example, capital murder's mens rea re-
quirement of "malice aforethought" may be implied from recklessness if
a killer is said to have the mental state or character defect variously de-
scribed as "an abandoned and wicked heart," "a depraved heart," "a de-
praved mind," "wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, recklessness
of consequences and a mind regardless of social duty," "wickedness of
heart or cruelty," or (in the Model Penal Code) "extreme indifference to
the value of human life." Even when a concern with inner wickedness
does not find its way into the definition of the crime, it often arises dra-
matically when character is considered for purposes of sentencing-par-
ticularly state level capital sentencing where such adjectives as "cruel,"
"heinous," and "depraved" loom large in characterizing aggravating fac-
49
tors.
Whatever can be said of this view of proper punishment, it cannot
be accused of failing to attempt to fix itself upon the highest, most
grand aspirations we have for justice. For a time Murphy concurred,'
but as of late, he has come to change his mind.5 ' Interestingly, charac-
ter retributivism's conceptual flaw seems to be that it is too grand, too
ambitious.12  Murphy is troubled that in applying punishment we
would be tempted to turn our contempt for the criminal, his crime,
his sick inner character, into outright cruelty.53 It is one short step
away from viewing the wrongdoer's fundamental character as termi-
43, at 142; MOORE, supra note 17, at 104-52; JEFFRIE G. MuRPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIvENESs AND MERcY 88-110 (1988).
" Murphy, supra note 45, at 153. Claudia Card has argued that cosmic justice, as
suggested by Dante through his conception of Hell, involves an analysis of desert in
terms of character. Card, supra note 15, at 185.
" Jefrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 79-80 (1995)
(footnote omitted) (quoting JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 461
(1991)).
Murphy, supra note 45, at 154 (celebrating "the moral legitimacy of character
retributivism" before qualifying that celebration).
" Id. Murphy has long criticized character retributivism as in tension with the
modem liberal state. Murphy, supra note 49, at 83-84. Facially I believe Murphy is
wrong on this point as well, but this discussion is beyond my focus here.
2 Murphy, supra note 45, at 158-59 (warning against "overdramatizing and over-
moralizing" a holy war of good against evil implied in viewing just punishment through
the lens of character retributivism).
'3 Id. at 154-55.
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nally rotten to outright and total condemnation. Murphy's recent
ruminations on Nietzsche5& have convinced him that "the possibilities
for self-deception" when evaluating the character of wrongdoers "are
enornous,"'o and our failure even to approximate accurate calibra-
tions of punishment under this theory will, more often than not, re-
sult not in justice, but mere hard-heartedness. "Realizing that we
might be motivated not by justice but by cruelty should make us pause
before we confidently march forward under the banner of character
retributivism."" But, in the end, Murphy's impassioned critique is not
all that demanding and his concerns are not all that new. The diffi-
culties involved in self- and other-knowledge are no bars, and certainly
no unique bars to the conceptual application of character retributiv-
ism.
Murphy argues that deep cognitive obstacles exist in discerning
accurate valuations of a wrongdoer's desert under character retributiv-
ism because it is difficult enough to know one's self, let alone an-
other's deep character, the state of that person's heart, and the extent
of his responsibility for his character. But first, as Murphy readily
admits, this is merely a reformulation of the long pondered problem
of other minds: how do we know what we think we know about oth-
ers' states of mind, their beliefs, dreams, knowledge, and intents?
There is no sense in which character retributivism is uniquely hobbled
by this problem more than any other notion that requires us to come
to conclusions about others' states of mind. Love is a good example.
The reductio of Murphy's other minds concern would vitiate the pos-
sibility of ever knowing, regardless of empirical data, that others love
you. This cannot be right.
Second, the other minds argument in the context of a criminal
trial proves too much. Murphy concedes that the very backbone of
the criminal law, the mens rea requirement, faces "nontrivial cognitive
problems" from an other minds charge. But no alternative to the in-
vestigation into a wrongdoer's guilty mind is offered, and none is self-
evident. Giving up mens rea altogether is no better. Within the con-
cept of mens rea are embedded all the assumptions of ourselves as
Id.
Murphy vrites in a footnote, "Nietzsche is best known, of course, for his sugges-
tion that the idea ofjust or deserved punishment may be a mask for cruelty, may turn
us into the very kind of monsters we seek to punish." Id. at 167 n.37.
Id. at 154.
" Id. at 155.
Id. at 157.
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autonomous agents, with normative capacity to choose among various
better and worse alternatives-in short, beings who live in a world of
ethical meaning. If the other minds critique is effective against char-
acter retributivism, it is equally effective against mens rea-neither is
acceptable. Both must be rejected.
Third, a full-blown other minds argument cannot help but land us
in solipsism. If we cannot know others, we cannot even be certain of
their existence as human beings like ourselves. Solipsism ends not
just the retributive project, in any of its flavors, but any kind of moral
theoretics, including notions of compassion, justice, or kindness. For
Murphy, a thinker first concerned with, at worst, accidental cruelty,
this must be an unacceptable outcome.
Murphy may respond that his real concern is not other minds, per
se, but the sort of cruelty born of self-delusion that we are likely to
foist upon others in the name of character retributivism." But it is
unclear why we would assume that, left up to their own devices, indi-
viduals tend to be cruel, not kind. Murphy says that contempt turns to
cruelty, but if this were ineluctably so, then Nietzsche (the thinker
from whom Murphy seems to be drawing many of his assumptions
about human nature) would not need to warn, as Murphy acknowl-
edges in a footnote about the danger of society, tending toward for-
giveness, becoming, over time, "soft, and tender."3' Moreover, as oth-
ers have argued, 2 and as my argument below demonstrates, 3 no part
of character retributivism demands cruelty of us. To the contrary,
character retributivism is the mechanism through which a clear dejus-
tification of the application of a capital sentence (in the particular
case) may be demonstrated.6 By any standard, the commutation of a
death sentence cannot be characterized as cruel.
Murphy also argues that retributive judgments are subject to two
moral obstacles. First, our unvirtuous judgments of others may in-
volve hypocrisy, and second, they may be motivated by the base pas-
Other analysts have likewise been concerned that retributive sentencing will of-
ten be inappropriately harsh. E.g., David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1623 (1992).
0 Murphy, supra note 45, at 167 n.37.
61 FRIEDRICH NiETzscHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 114 (Walter Kaufmann trans.,
Vintage 1989) (1886).
'2 Leo Katz et a., Notes and Questions, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 348, 350
(Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999).
f3 See infra Part III (arguing that under certain circumstances character transforma-
tion dejustifies capital sentences in a retributive scheme).
64 Infra Part III.
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sions of envy, malicious hatred, and spite.5 But if these are problems,
they are not retributive problems. That is, we may be hypocrites, cast-
ingjudgement upon others based upon low passions, but this does not
necessarily make our judgments wrong. Second, these are not con-
ceptual issues, but rather issues of application. They could very well
be solved by striving to place the judgments of punishment in the
hands of the least base and least hypocritical among us. If Murphy's
deeper claim is that, when it comes to judging others, we are all base
hypocrites, then this is likely an assumption, I would hope, not widely
shared and facially counterintuitive. Third, to the extent that Mur-
phy's concern here is sound, it would indict notjust retributive justice,
but likely all theories of punishment.6 Estimations of psychological
deterrent effects in deterrence theory or valuations of a wrongdoer's
"criminality" in rehabilitation theory are both vulnerable to base emo-
tional tampering, regardless of their claims to empirical or scientific
objectivity.'
Third, Murphy's deeper concern about our personal base hypoc-
risy is revealed in his defense of Christ's sermon on the mount." In
Murphy, supra note 45, at 157.
Katz et al., supra note 62, at 350 (asking, rhetorically, if demands for knowledge
of a wrongdoer's desert are any more difficult than demands for knowledge of net so-
cial utility in consequentialist sentencing).
,7 Presuming that soft sciences-such as the social sciences underlying utility calcu-
lus or psychology disciplines that undergird rehabilitation therapies-even resemble
the hard sciences, there are at least three major ways in which a scientist's personal
values enter into the scientific process:
First, scientific facts are not immanent in an objective reality waiting to be dis-
covered by any scientists who look in the right place. Instead, they are con-
structed and validated through a social process dominated by those in the sci-
entific community who possess authority to do so. Second, this validation
process is itself shaped by the scientific paradigms, the shared assumptions
and prejudices of the professional community that dominate the thought of a
particular period. These paradigms hold sway for reasons that may have less
to do with their intrinsic merit than with their support of existing social struc-
tures, including the scientific establishment. Third, the authority to validate
science rests in part on boundary-drawing and other strategic behavior by sci-
entific disputants, behavior that can effectively exclude their less influential
competitors.
Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Polities, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 1, 15-16 (1993).
- "He who is without sin among you, let him throw a stone at her first." John 8:7.
Christ's admonition against casting stones is not a warning about casting judgments
whatsoever, at best it is a warning about the risks ofjudging others. Judging is not risk
free. But failing to evaluate right from wrong and discern good from evil has costs too.
Among them is a dangerous and ape-like quietism of hearing, seeing, and speaking no
evil.
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an effort to express greater "generosity of spirit,"" Murphy concludes
that our judgments of others must occur only with "caution, regret,
humility, and with a vivid realization that we are involved in a fallible
and finite human institution. But here he has gone too far as well.
He is right to say that moral judgments are difficult and that character
retributivism demands that we, to some extent, risk hubris, self-
involvement, hypocrisy, and, even at times, acting from cruelty and
base viciousness. But this potential for fallibility does not damn the
venture outright. As actors in a moral universe, our judgments are
not supererogatory. Rather, we are required on a daily basis to dis-
cern, within ourselves and within others, good from bad and right
from wrong. The possibility for abuse and self-deception is dazzling,
but the possibility of moral quietism-in essence, opting out of the
entire challenge for fear of belying our own sallow character, for fear
of being perceived as playing "God"--is even more daunting.7' Eating
of the tree of good and evil has cast us into the moral universe.
Once there, it is our unique province not as gods, but as people, to
denounce evil and to reject vice when we see it. Skepticism here
about our ability to fulfil this mandate is a skepticism about our ability
to be full human beings.
One last critique should be considered. Murphy's more general
grudge against character retributivism may be interpreted as against a
noncharacter flavor of retributive justice. That is, retributive justice
might be thought of exclusively as a backward-looking theory of pun-
ishment, examining the guilty mind and the bad act of the criminal at
the time of commission. In that way, retributivism would leave no
room for discussions of desert as determined by after-the-fact charac-
ter analysis. Put simply, retributivism is in the business of punishing
the act, not the man. But this is a very narrow conception of retribu-
tive justice.7 3 There seems to be no apparent reason why retributivism
would not or could not involve character analysis in desert determina-
tions.74 Objections, like Murphy's, as to how character retributivism
' urphy, supra note 45, at 162 n.5.
70 Id. at 160-61.
71 Id. at 161.
72 Genesis 3:6-19.
73 While discussing this issue, even Professor Michael Moore, a dyed-in-the-wool
retributivist, described this particular concern as "semantic." Interview with Michael
Moore, Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania Law School, in
Phila., Pa. (Jan. 2000).
74 See also Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Des-
ert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323, 353 (1992) ("[T]here remains an
RESURRECTION FROM A DEATH SENTENCE
must be corrupt in its application, or conceptually overambitious, fail.
Moreover, our analysis of desert in the current administration of
American justice often examines the wrongdoer's character." For ex-
ample, we do not execute the insane, regardless of their mental state
at the time of the murder.7' This cannot be explained by rote recita-
tion of the elements of the crime alone. And interestingly, the newly
conceived three-strikes laws appear to take character quite seriously in
meting out punishment." Arguably, three-strikes laws have a deter-
rent effect, but equally arguably, a third-time felon would tend to de-
serve, in the language of character retributivism, more punishment
than the first-time felon-not necessarily because the third crime was
more egregious than the previous two, but because the wrongdoer has
argument against culpability as the sole focus of capital sentencing.").
'Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit writes: "You can only be sentenced for
committing a particular discrete act, but when you are sentenced you may be sen-
tenced on how you have conducted all the rest of your life. [The] character-focused
approach to punishment [wvas made central by] the California death penalty statute."
John T. Noonan, Jr., Horses of the Night: Harris v. Vasquez, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1011, 1013
(1993).
Locket v. Ohio and its progeny entitle the offender to introduce, and to have the
sentencer consider as a basis for rejecting the death penalty, any evidence relating to
the offender's character, record, or crime. 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (Burger, C.J., al-
ternative holding) ("[Wie conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments re-
quire that the sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."); see also
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (plurality opinion) (applying the Lock-
et Court's conclusion as a rule). Justice O'Connor has defined the inquiry into desert
for capital crimes as including evidence about the defendant's background and char-
acter. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986), the Court held that "the
Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a
prisoner who is insane," because such an execution would be "savage and inhuman,"
id. at 406 (internal quotation omitted), "a miserable spectacle, both against Law, and
of extream [sic] inhumanity and cruelty," id. at 407 (internal quotation omitted),
"cruel and inhumane," id. at 408 n.1 (internal quotation omitted), and "abhorren[t],"
id. at 409. If we were punishing merely the act and not the man, such a prohibition
would be nonsensical. In addition, the Court's language here, discussing matters of
cruelty and inhumanity, makes it fairly clear that in the execution of the insane, deter-
rence is a nonissue.
" Under most three-strikes schemes, a wrongdoer who has committed a third fel-
on), is not punished only for that particular crime, but bears an additional penalty for
having failed to take the opportunity of his second and third chances, regardless of
whatever debt the wrongdoer has already paid for his previous transgressions. See
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 724 (1998) ("Under California's three-strikes law, a
defendant convicted of a felony who has two qualifying prior convictions for serious
felonies receives a minimum sentence of 25 years to life; when the instant conviction
was preceded by one serious felony offense, the court doubles a defendant's term of
imprisonment." (internal quotation omitted)).
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proven himself to be a person without a conscience, without genuine
guilt or remorse, in short, a person of bad character. This is likely the
intuitive appeal behind the three-strikes laws. Conceptually, there is
no problem with examining after-the-fact character in a retributive
scheme. Limiting such a consideration would only serve to truncate a
fuller, more robust desert analysis.]
C. Justifying the Death Penalty
Retributive justice,l more than any other theory of punishment, is
central to discussions of the death penalty. Neither of the other two
major vying theories, deterrence nor rehabilitation, sufficiently ex-
plains why we sometimes put prisoners to death.
Deterrence theory argues-from within a consequentialist frame-
work--that since punishment (or, more precisely, the risk of pun-
ishment multiplied by its severity) outweighs the potential gains of
criminal activity (or the likelihood of gains multiplied by its intensity),
would-be criminals are deterred from violating the law."' The death
penalty, ostensibly, is the most effective deterrent available, because
"people fear death more than anything else."82 But empirical studies
have never been able to establish what deterrent effects, if any, flow
from capital sentencing.8 3 In fact, a recent, well-lauded New York Times
7" "An inference from the wrongful act to the actor's character is essential to a re-
tributive theory of punishment." GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LiW
§ 10.3.1 (1978).
'q Hereinafter, all discussions of retributive justice are presumptively discussions of
character retributivism.
W Ashworth, supra note 44, at 335.
81 See Karl F. Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of the Death Penalty, in THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT 181, 182 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971) (explaining that deterrence is
based on a psychological hedonic calculus).
82 Id.
83 At best, studies on the deterrent effect of the death penalty are confusing and
contradictory. See generally Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Is Capital Punishment
an Effective Deterrent for Murder? An Examination of Social Science Research, in AMERIc'S
EXPERIMENT WrH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (James tL Acker et al. eds., 1998); Bijou Yang,
Economic Analysis of the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALiY:
ISSUES AND ANSwERS 83, 83-105 (David Lester ed., 2d ed. 1998) (reviewing research on
the deterrent effect of the death penalty from an econometric perspective).
Michael Ross, an inmate at the correctional institute in Somers, Connecticut,
speaks from experience when he argues that deterrence has a negligible influence on
the mind of a murderer.
What [deterrence theory] assum[es] is that a murderer thinks as rationally
as [others] do.
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study suggests that an inverse relationship may even exist between
murder and the death penalty.84 Capital punishment appears to ac-
celerate homicide rates.85 Certainly the great majority, sixty-seven per-
cent, of law-enforcement officials "do not believe capital punishment
reduces the homicide rate. "86 And, in the sentencing of capital of-
fenders, utilitarian goals often make little difference to the public
anyway. Citizens overwhelmingly believe that deterrent effects are
really beside the point in the administration of the death penalty.8'
I have been incarcerated for more than 10 years now and I have yet to meet
anyone who expected to be caught and punished for their crimes. Rather,
they expect to get away with it because of good planning. There can be no de-
terrent value in a punishment that one does not ever expect to receive.
A second type of murder is equally unlikely to be deterred by capital pun-
ishment: the spontaneous, emotionally driven murder. Such a murderer
doesn't... coolly consider the foreseeable consequences of their actions....
Fear of death, in itself, will not prevent this type of crime.
Michael Ross, Criminals Are Not Deterred by the Death Penalty, in DOES CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT DETER CRIME? 39, 41 (Stephen E. Schonebaum ed., 1998).
" "In a state-by-state analysis, The Times found that during the last 20 years, the
homicide rate in states with the death penalty has been 48 percent to 101 percent
higher than in states without the death penalty." Raymond Bonner & Ford Fessenden,
States with No Death Penalty Share Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2000, at Al.
The Times study further reports that "10 of the 12 states without capital punishment
have homicide rates below the national average," and concludes "that the threat of the
death penalty rarely deters criminals." Id.
Id.
Death Defiing, SCI. AMN1., Feb. 2001, at 28.
Interestingly, when asked in polls, citizens initially say deterrence is the most im-
portant element in their reasoning to support or oppose the death penalty. See, e.g.,
Dov Cohen, Law, Social Poliy, and Violence: The Impact of Regional Cultures, 70 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961, 970 (1996) (discussing how people emphasized
"protection" when supporting the death penalty); Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross,
Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and
R'tentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116, 145 (1983) ("[B]elief in the deterrent efficacy of
the death penalty has generally been the rationale most frequently offered by Reten-
tionists." (citation omitted)); see also Tom R. Tyler & Renee Weber, Support for the Death
Penalty: Instrumental Response to Crime, or Symbolic Attitude?, 17 LAw & Soc'V REV. 21, 25
(1982) ("[W]hen self-reported motives for death penalty support have been measured
in public opinion polls, the results usually suggest that deterrence is the major underly-
ing motive for death penalty support."); Robert L.Jackson, Study Assails Mandatory Drug
Clime Sentences, LA. TIMES, May 13, 1997, at A14 ("'The principal value of mandatory
minimum sentences is the certainty of punishment and the deterrent message that that
sends.' (quoting the remarks of Rep. Bill McCollum)). Further questioning, however,
belies this contention. Pollsters then ask whether conclusive proof of a deterrent's ef-
ficacy, or lack thereof, would affect the respondent's opinion. The great majority,
ironically, indicate that such information would not be enough to change their posi-
tions. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans'
Viea'ys on the Death Penalty, 50J. Soc. ISSUEs 19, 27, 32 (1994) (finding that people's atti-
tudes toward the death penalty are not determined by their beliefs in its deterrent ef-
fectiveness); Tyler & Weber, supra, at 26 (finding that sixty-six percent of those who
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The public does not like the idea of executing one person just be-
cause it may prevent some other person from committing a wholly un-
related crime in the future.
Rehabilitation, the second major theory of punishment, does no
better in explaining capital sentencing. Whereas deterrence is
grounded in consequentialism, rehabilitative theory is grounded in
distributive justice,s the principle that we should make the "less well
off better off."8 9 Rehabilitation wants to portray criminals as acting
not from volition but from a sort of affliction passed to them through
their environment. Much in the way that medicine seeks to cure a
patient of disease, rehabilitation therapies attempt to cure the wrong-
doer of his criminality.9' But rehabilitative theory can never justify the
death penalty for the simple reason that execution is not a form of
therapy and in no case will the criminal be better off for it. For what-
ever reason and under whatever justification the death penalty oper-
ates in America, it is not adequately explained by rehabilitation the-
92
Ory.
The most important point here is not, as some have argued, that
retributive justice is, by a process of elimination, the best theory
among three,3 but that it is the primary principle under which the
Court and our culture have justified capital punishment. Carol and
Jordan Steiker have isolated four doctrines at the heart of the Court's
said they supported the death penalty indicated that they would still support it even if
it had no deterrent value). This seems to argue for the conclusion that deterrence
considerations in fact play but a minimal role in citizens' decisions to support or op-
pose capital punishment.
The seminal proponent of distributive justice, John Rawls, has described his the-
ory-justice as fairness-as based on "the principles that free and rational persons
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality
as defining the fundamental terms of their association." RAWLS, supra note 34, at 10.
' Leo Katz et al., Humanitarian or Scientific Alternatives to Punishment: The Rehabilita-
tive Idea, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 90, 90 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999).
See B.F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW
94, 96 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999) ("It is the environment which is 'responsible' for the
objectionable behavior. ...").
"' See Karl Menninger, The Crime of Punishment, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW
91, 94 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that psychiatry examines wrongdoers for a
psychological condition, not a normative one).
In reference to the "most rehabilitated prisoner in America," Wilbert Rideau,
the district attorney remarked, "In a murder case, I think rehabilitation is totally irrele-
vant." Royal Brightbill, Why Does a Pardon Still Elude "the Most Rehabilitated Prisoner in
America"?, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Feb. 2, 1992, at Mi.
9- See MOORE, supra note 17, at 103 (arguing that "retributivism [is] the only re-
maining theory of punishment that we can accept").
RESURRECTION FROM A DEATH SENTENCE
post-Furman jurisprudence. The first doctrine, proportionality, is an
outgrowth of the Court's "concerns about 'desert' from a retributive
perspective."', The other three doctrines, (1) fairness or equality of
application in the administration of the penalty, (2) concern for indi-
vidualized sentencing, and (3) heightened reliability, are arguably di-
rected at ensuring judicious application of retributive principles."
Conspicuously absent from this list is a concern for the ends or values
of deterrence or rehabilitation. And although the Court now permits
the capital-penalty phase to serve nonretributive goals, 9 its language
"seems to resonate most naturally with the language and rhetoric of
retributivism."' '  I have chosen retributivism in which to embed my
thesis,7" partly because I believe it more accurately captures what we
.4 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decade of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355, 371-72
(1995).
Id. at 371.
Id. at 371-72. Fairness (or equality) is not a retributive principle per se, but
might be a useful metric by which to determine desert. For example, imagine that we
measure Willow Rosenberg and determine that she is five and a half feet tall, and we
do not know how tall Buffy Summers is, but we do know that she is the same height as
Ms. Rosenberg. We can deduce that Ms. Summers is also five and a half feet tall.
Likewise, if in the past we have determined that bad actor A deserved, say, ten units of
punishment, we can know that bad actor B, if he is in all significant ways like bad actor
A, also desenes ten units of punishment. That is, B does not deserve ten units because
A deserved ten units, but rather as a matter of deduction, within a discipline fraught
rith uncertainty, we might calculate desert through comparative measurements. This
is perhaps why the court has examined equality in the first place.
As to the other two elements, individualized sentences seem like a tip of the hat to
character retributivism, and heightened reliability is clearly a retributive impulse be-
cause lower thresholds of reliability can still meet rehabilitative and, especially, (gen-
eral) deterrent goals, but in no case would achieve the ends of retributive justice.
See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 510 (1995) (holding that the purpose
served by capital punishment should be left to the policy choice of the community).
"" Stephen P. Garvey, -As the Gentle Rain from Heaven" Aercy in Capital Sentencing
81 CORNELL L. REv. 989, 992 (1996); see also, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319
(1989) (insisting that a death sentence should represent a "reasoned moral response"
(citation and internal quotation omitted)). But see Garvey, supra, at 993 n.17 (listing
articles that argue that retributive justice is incompatible with the death penalty). Go-
ing further, one theorist argues: "[T]he criminal justice system is based on the as-
sumption that persons who commit particular offenses are deserving of punishment,
and that it is possible to establish the particular punishment deserved by each offender
based on the nature of her crime." Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrest-
ing the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 580 (1991) (citation omit-
ted). The principles of "retributiv[ism] ... of fairness and proportionality to our sys-
tem of punishment" are central. Id. at 581.
-" See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (explaining that this Comment be-
gins ith retributive justice because retributism is the most nourishing theory in
which to grow the Transformation Thesis).
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mean when we argue about justice' ° and because I believe justice to
be law's central theme.
IL THE TRILOGY: DEFINING AND EXPLAINING THE AGENTS OF CHANGE
This Part examines the effects of guilt, remorse, and penance on
desert in a retributive scheme. Guilt, it turns out, is a disassociative
emotion that serves as a gateway to remorse, but guilt alone fails to
catalyze character transformation. Remorse, by contrast, serves as an
expression of the rejection of the wrongdoer's bad act and the bad
character that made such an act possible. Transformation begins here
when remorse, harnessing emotional remonstrative force, breaks
down the old self and aids in reconstructing a new one bearing a
moral perspective. Penance finishes the process by exhausting guilt
and remorse to make way for the newly autonomous, ethically trans-
formed. Through guilt (initially), remorse, and penance the con-
demned's character is transformed.
This argument begins and is premised upon an emerging area of
thought that views passions not simply as irrational and dangerous,"'
but as indicative of deeply held beliefs and moral claims."" Emotional
epistemology, as it has been called, argues that passions have a cogni-
tive structure that renders them, at least partially, subject to rational• • 103
control and consideration. This is not to say, however, that all pas-
'0' See generally 1 E. BRUNNER, JUSTICE AND SOCIAL ORDER 17 (M. Hottinger trans.,
1945) ("From time immemorial the principle ofjustice has been defined as the suum
cuique-the rendering to each man of his due."); AGNES HELLER, BEYOND JUSTICE
156-79 (1987) (arguing that retribution-the rendering to each offender her due-is
the sole principle of punishment that can be called a principle of justice). Kathleen
Dean Moore has argued, "One thing all retributivist theories have in common-and
what distinguishes them from nonretributivist theories-is that they ground justifica-
tions in an overall view ofjustice." DEAN MOORE, supra note 33, at 93. Her conception
ofjustice involves not only retributivism, but negative retributivism: "Punishing people
who deserve punishment-and not punishing people who do not deserve punish-
ment-is a kind ofjustice." Id. at 94.
1 See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 4 (asserting that condemnation is not
justified simply because certain passions may provoke dangerous conduct).
102 See id. at 5 (arguing that emotional states are, at least in part, states of belief).
'oS See id. at 5 n.7 (explaining that all negative emotions, such as guilt, shame, and
resentment, "feel[] bad," such that the way in which they are distinguishable from one
another is through the cognitive state that attaches to them). The notion that the way
one feels is linked in essential ways to one's ethical and cognitive constitution has an
impressive pedigree. See ARISTOTLE, SELECTIONS 359 (Terence Irwin & Gall Fine
trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1995) (n.d.) (indicating that the highest ethical condi-
tion, happiness, is that which is most pleasant). For Aristotle, happiness is itself an
ethical condition. Id. at 355. Under an objective-oriented view of retributivism, how-
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sions in all circumstances ought to dictate our moral judgments.
Some emotions, such as those resulting from phobias, are entirely dis-
connected from the external events that trigger them. 4 Emotions of
intense fear in the face of minimal danger or, conversely, deep pleas-
ure in the face of ruin are irrational"' and should not be considered
when making normative evaluations. But within limits, emotions are
useful in expressing cognitive appraisals.0 6 Dan Kahan and Martha
Nussbaum compellingly argue that emotions can inform the most
"brutally and uncompromisingly" truthful ethical conclusions. 0 "The
law is more likely to be just," they explain, "when decision makers are
forced" to use the "evaluative conception" in their decision calculus.""
A. The Gateway of Guilt
Within a retributive framework, emotions do not justify punish-
ment, but they are still strong indicators of desert.'9 Like a forest
guide who knows how to read the terrain for signs of game or the im-
minent approach of predators, emotions read the ethical landscape
and alert us to the indicators of good and evil." " Moore, in the same
ever, emotional and cognitive states may be (at best) indicators of the right, not them-
selves the right. See MOORE, supra note 17, at 131 (maintaining that emotions are
-heuristic guides to moral insight," but are not the "experience out of which moral
theory is constructed").
" "[P]hobias are irrational fears in the sense that they are directed to an object
that is not in fact dangerous or reasonably believed to be so." MURPFI & HAMPTON,
Wipra note 47, at 5-6 n.7.
"" All emotions may be described as irrational, but healthy emotions are at least
partially rational in this sense: they accurately reflect some aspect of the outside world
that is attractive or repellent. "[I]rrational or destructive or self-demeaning emotions,"
a-s Murphy says, do not induce an internal attraction to the good and repulsion to the
evil, and thus make us "enslaved" by our own broken compass. Id. at 9.
""' See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 273 (1996) ("[E]motions express cognitive apprais-
als .... [T]hese appraisals can themselves be morally evaluated, and... persons (indi-
vidually and collectively) can and should shape their emotions through moral educa-
tion.").
'" Id. at 274.
Id. Paul Gewirtz finds in the Greek classic, The Oresteia, a deep and "haunting"
understanding of the law: "[L]aw is not and cannot be an enterprise of reason alone;
it includes the nonrational emotions as an essential and central ingredient. Law may
be in part-perhaps in largest part-a process of reasoned judgment, but it also en-
gages forces beyond reason, like most other things in life." Paul Gewirtz, Aeschylus'
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1043, 1049 (1988).
J- See MOORE, supra note 17, at 131 (indicating that emotions are "heuristic guides
to moral insight" but not themselves the "experience out of which moral theory is con-
structed").
"" See id. at 116 (suggesting that emotions "generate moral insights"). Some phi-
113520011
1136 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149:1115
vein as Kahan and Nussbaum, argues that the emotion of guilt may be
helpful in determining desert."' He recounts the ugly tale of Richard
Herrin, a Yale graduate student, who took a claw hammer to the back
of his ex-girlfriend's head while she was asleep, bludgeoning her to
death."' Moore asks us to put ourselves in Herrin's place." What
would we feel, having just brutally murdered a former lover? Moore
says, "[m]y own response, I hope, would be that I would feel guilty
unto death. I could not imagine any suffering that could be imposed
upon me that would be unfair because it exceeded what I deserved."".
Our own hypothetical feelings of guilt in this context are useful in de-
termining what sort of punishment we would deserve: "to feel guilty
causes the judgement that we are guilty, in the sense that we are mor-
ally responsible.... we deserve punishment... [and] we ought to be
punished." 5 If we have determined that, hypothetically, a certain
amount of punishment is due us, then that same amount of punish-
ment must, in actuality, be due Herrin." 6 Personal (even if hypotheti-
cal) feelings of guilt, Moore concludes, can be used as an instrument
in helping to determine the desert of others.' 11 But what exactly is
meant by guilt?
Guilt is, primarily, a disassociative emotion. The guilty agent at-
tempts to disconnect himself from the act at issue by suffering self-
inflicted psychic punishment."" Traditional psychoanalytic theory ar-
gues that we punish ourselves with guilt under these conditions in or-
der to avoid the imminent wrath of the father. The logic here is that a
just father exacts punishment commensurate with desert and does not
punish redundantly for a wrong already self-retributed. Guilt, thus,
losophers have gone even further and argued that emotions are, in fact, the very
grounds for our notions of desert. See generally HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF
ETHICS 264-94 (John Rawls ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 7th ed. 1981) (1907).
I MOORE, supra note 17, at 145 ("To the extent such outrage motivates the par-
ticularjudgements that are our concern, its virtue evidences the truth of those judge-
ments."); see also GRINBERG, supra note 11, at 28 (suggesting that guilt is intimately
connected with the issues of what makes a good person, what makes a good society,
and what is the very nature of good and evil).
1 MOORE, supra note 17, at 145.
113 Id.
114 Id.
15 Id. at 147-48.
16 Id. at 148-49 (concluding that failure to use the same standard in evaluating de-
sert for others that we use for ourselves is untenable elitism).
17 Id. at 148 (asserting that the guilt hypothetical may indicate desert).
18 See IRVING L. JANIS ET AL., PERSONALnIY: DYNAMICS, DEVELOPMENT, AND
ASSESSMENT 119 (Irving L. Janis ed., 1969) (describing guilt feelings as inflicted upon
one's self "as a form of self-punishment").
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acts as the internal, or psychic, counterpart to corporal, or bodily,
punishment."
Guilt alone, however, is insufficient for ethical transformation.'
20
It does serve as a gateway to remorse, pricking our ears like an early
warning signal of something gone awry,' 2' but as many of us can attest
to in our personal experience, it is quite possible to feel guilty about
what one has done and still fail to change, or even attempt to change,
the underlying motivations, inclinations, desires, or beliefs, in short, it
is possible to fail to change the character that caused the bad act to
occur in the first place." This is because guilt is an instance-specific
emotion.' The guilty wrongdoer may agonize over his bad act x and
may even wish bad act x never occurred, but ironically will not neces-
sarily be prohibited by that guilt from then seeking out and engaging
in bad act y, even if bad act y is, in all important ways, identical to bad
act x. Wrongdoers can go their whole lives feeling painfully guilty
while still engaging in the wrongful behavior that produces that
guilt."" This is because guilt is, first, instance-specific, and second,
"" The process is fluid not only in that internal punishment can offset external
punishment, but also in that the reverse can occur as well. In this vein, Morris tells the
story of a young boy who failed in his chores and thus sought punishment because "[i]t
diminished the young boy's guilt, diminished it in a way that it would not have been
were the father merely to have" scolded the boy. Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory
oJ Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263, 267 (1981). Here the suggestion is that external
punishment can offset internal guilt and that sometimes the wrongdoer welcomes the
trade.
"" SeeJeanne Shaw, The Usefulness of Remorse, 5 PSYCHOTHERAPY PATIENT 77, 80
(1988) (explaining that guilt alone obstructs change and "seduces one to stay the
same, to fool oneself"); E. Mark Stem, The Psychotherapy of Remorse, 5 PSYCHOTHERAPY
PATIENT 1, 1-2 (1988) (indicating that guilt is a narrow, "reactive," and "short-lived"
emotion that from a psychological perspective can never predicate any sort of authen-
tic resolution).
S"1 Set Frederic Feichtinger, The Psychology of Guilt Feelings, 8 INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOL.
BULL. 39, 41 (1950) (describing guilt as an early warning "alarm signal" of our moral
failures); see also Michael F. Hoyt, Concerning Remorse: i7th Special Attention to Its Defen-
sive Function, II J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOANALYSIs 435, 442 (1983) ("Remorse involves a
sense of guilt), and shameful condemnation .....
See Feichtinger, supra note 121, at 41 (explaining that guilt does not preclude
fixation on the guilt to the detriment of learning to "adjust, to adapt," or in other
words, to change one's self).
W See Samuel Juni, Remorse as a Derivative Psychoanalytic Construct, 51 AM. J.
PS-VCHoANuALYsIS 71, 72 (1991) (detailing various philosophers' differentiation of guilt
as referring only to "past activities" from "conscience," which has the power to affect
future acts).
U1 See Rudolf Dreikurs, Guilt Feelings as an Excuse, 8 INDIVDUAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 12,
17 (1950) (indicating that guilt-bearers "do not necessarily refrain from misbehaving
in the same way again"); Shaw, supra note 120, at 81 (suggesting that when guilt in-
spires one to apologize, "it is meaningless because the transgression will recur and
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necessary, but not sufficient, for character transformation.
Guilt's effect on desert is likewise insubstantial. One psychology-
based explanation of guilt is that the guilt-bearer believes that he is
somehow better off by punishing himself rather than waiting for pa-
ternal reprimand. There is some sense of gaining the benefit of a
bargain, of either getting off with less punishment than deserved or at
least suffering equivalent actual punishment but dodging an associ-
ated indirect rebuke such as the disapproval of the father or the gen-
eralized (but real) fear of the unknown (in this case, the unknown
punishment). This is why guilt alone has sometimes been criticized as
a parsimonious and pusillanimous emotion. Moreover, since a
guilty conscience fails necessarily to implicate character transforma-
tion, it is subject to two additional criticisms. First, nontransformative
guilt calls its own sincerity into doubt. After all, how meaningful is it
really for a wrongdoer to wish the wrong had not been done if the
wrongdoer is willing to commit a similar wrong in the future?'" Sec-
ond, nontransformative guilt may be attacked as ultimately superficial.
If the force of guilt-inspired immolation is insufficient to reforge the
wrongdoer's character such that the wrongdoer would prefer, all in
all, to suffer similar guilt for similar wrongs in the future rather than
stomach the additional toil of shifting his character perspective, then
perhaps guilt is not as deeply wounding as we imagine it to be. For
these reasons, guilt alone fails to affect substantially the wrongdoer's
character and thus has little to say as to his proper desert.
To explore how this dissection of guilt fits in with Moore's, recon-
sider his well-known guiltless criminal. After three years in prison,
Herrin remarked to an interviewer that he thought his eight- to
twenty-five-year sentence "was excessive" and that a one- to two-year• 127
sentence would have been more appropriate. Moore upbraids Her-
both parties know this").
' See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Origin of Guilt, in GUILT: MAN AND SOCIETY 27, 58
(Roger W. Smith ed., 1971) (describing guilt as a strange tool with which Christians
institute degrading policies of self-imposed cruelty); Richard D. Parsons, Forgiving-Not-
Forgetting, 5 PSYCHOTHERAPY PATIENT 259, 261 (1988) (indicating that guilt is "a de-
structive, dysfunctional state").
r The person who really regrets what he has done, because of his lack of un-
derstanding of himself and the situation, will not be satisfied with a "bad" con-
science and feeling of guilt, but he will shoulder the responsibility for his deed
and learn from it to do better. He will not hide behind guilt feelings for
things past, but attempt to create an improved present.
Lydia Sicher, Guilt and Guilt Feelings, 8 INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 4, 11 (1950).
127 MOORE, supra note 17, at 146.
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in's "easily obtained self-absolution"''8 and further comments about
how Herrin ought to feel: "[D]eep feelings of guilt seem to me to be
the only tolerable response of a moral being."",9 When he reflects
upon his own feelings, Moore's language takes on a self-flagellating
aspect: "My own response, I hope, would be that I would feel guilty
unto death. I could not imagine any suffering that could be imposed
upon me that would be unfair because it exceeded what I de-
served.... One ought to feel so guilty one wants to die."',' The emo-
tion Moore calls "guilt" appears to have at least three characteristics:
(1) it is a deeply painful emotion; (2) it should be welcomed by the
wrongdoer as a just punishment administered by, and upon, himself;
and (3) it is connected to, or is a response from, his normative nature.
But according to the definition set out above, guilt has few of these
properties. It is painful at times, but often not painful enough to
change future actions. It is administered by the wrongdoer upon
himself, but sometimes unjustifiably so. For these reasons, its link to
our personal ethical framework is dubious. Others have agreed and
criticized Moore's description of guilt as an inaccurate epistemologi-
cal indicator of desert: "We all know (even without reading Freud)
that our guilts are often neurotic-misplaced and irrational and de-
structive."', The force of retribution Moore expects from emotional-
ity is not found in guilt, but in remorse. Were Moore to define the
terms of his discussion as I have, he would, I believe, agree.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Murphy, supra note 45, at 152.
The reasons why Moore has differed in his definition of guilt are likely three-
fold. First, the exact definitions of terms like guilt and remorse are no more certain
than definitions of any emotional term. Guilt has been described as a concept with
"blurred edges," with ideas from "sin, [and] punishment, [to] repentance, [and] puri-
fication," spinning in its penumbra. Roger W. Smith, Introduction to GUILT: MLkN AND
SOCIETY 17, 20 (Roger W. Smith ed., 1971). My definitions of guilt and remorse, ad-
mittedly, serve to advance my theory. That Moore did not happen to choose the same
definitions to advance his, given the wide latitude of reasonable interpretation, is not
surprising.
Second, Moore likely chose guilt, and not remorse, partly for its linguistic appeal.
He writes, for example, that "to feel guilty causes the judgement that we are guilty."
MOORE, supra note 17, at 147. The same argument would lose much of its self-evident
ring if Moore chose the word remorse within which to embed all the exact same no-
tions of self-remonstration: imagine, "to feel remorseful causes the judgement that we
are guilty." The powerful sense of apparent tautological veracity would have been lost.
(f. Dreikurs, supra note 124, at 13 ("At the root of the confusion lies a semantic prob-
lem. Guilt has little to do with guilt feelings. One may be guilty and not suffer from
guilt, feelings; conversely, one may feel guilty without being so.").
2001] 1139
1140 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149:1115
B. The Force of Remorse
Remorse 13  is similar to guilt, but subsumes it.?4 Like guilt, re-
morse also exhibits disassociative qualities. 5 But unlike guilt, the re-
morseful wrongdoer separates himself not only from the bad act, but
from the bad actor and the character that inspired the act.'l And,
whereas guilt is instance-specific, remorse is universal: to feel re-
morseful about some specific wrongdoing means actively to avoid fu-
Third, the success of Moore's thought experiment depends upon the reader's abil-
ity to call upon his emotions in response to an anecdote. MOORE, supra note 17, at
145. Most of us would not have too much difficulty in summoning and then measur-
ing our hypothetical guilt reactions, partly because guilt is somewhat of a shallow emo-
tion, and partly because we often find ourselves feeling guilty for all sorts of inappro-
priate reasons, even when we have not done anything wrong. See MADDI, supra note 3,
at 53 (indicating that guilt can allow mature people to "feel morally culpable even if
they do not act on it"). Generating guilt for a thought experiment is not all that diffi-
cult. But try to substitute remorse. Most people, when asked to feel remorse, imagin-
ing they were Richard Herrin, would likely respond, "But I'm not Richard Herrin" or
"I haven't done what he has done." Trying to feel remorse where it does not arise or-
ganically is much harder than trying to feel guilt because remorse runs deeper than
guilt and has meaning and substance that guilt does not. Moore's demonstration
would fail to get off the ground if he chose remorse instead of guilt for his central
emotional heuristic. Perhaps this is why he avoided it.
'33 As a word, "remorse" derives from an experiential base stemming from a
mind-body process, for it is a mental state, or mental act, if you will, cast in
bodily terms, "the act of biting again" (ME, fr. MF remors, fr. ML remorsus, p.p.
of remordere fr. re + mmodere, to re-bite). Etymologically and philologically, the
word is very close to the word "smart," which in its preferred meaning is "to
smart," which is "to pain" (OHG smerzan), "to bite" (L. mordere), and "to waste
away" (Gk. maraineia). Remorse involves mentally and experientially chewing
on the past in a way so painful and so protracted as to possibly cause one to
waste away. It is to smart, re-bite the past, chew on it without mastication, or at
least without digestion: repeat; repeat, ad nauseum.
James E. Dublin, Remorse As Mental Dyspepsia, 5 PSYCHOTHERAPY PATIENT 161, 165
(1988).
"'4 See DAVID WECHSLER, MANUAL FOR THE WECHSLER ADULT INTELLIGENCE SCALE
99 (1981) (defining remorse as "a feeling of distress or regret caused by a sense of
guilt"); Hugh Gunnison, Rachel, Remorse, and Hypnocounseling 5 PSYCHOTHERAPY
PATIENT 147, 148 (1988) ("Guilt becomes remorse when the feelings do not subside
and go deeper, to touch the bone marrow of the person. There exists a sadness, a
long-term mourning or grieving that does not appear in the more common and fleet-
ing feelings of guilt."); Stern, supra note 120, at 2 (indicating that guilt forms the "lat-
tice" to remorse and that remorse makes guilt "meaningful").
r: See ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC
ORDER 113 (1971) (indicating that remorse expressed through an apology "is a gesture
through which an individual splits himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an
offense and the part that dissociates itself from the delict").
1 See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 26 (suggesting that true repentance
is "the clearest way in which a wrongdoer can sever himself from his past wrong").
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ture acts that resemble that wrongdoing. 37 Thus, genuine remorse is
not only more powerful than guilt, but dimensionally different be-
cause of its transformative effects.! Remorse, as a concept, unlike
guilt, cannot be attacked as insincere or insubstantial because it nei-
ther permits the wrongdoer to engage in similar behavior in the fu-
ture nor can it be accused of failing to affect the wrongdoer's charac-
ter logic.,'
4
Remorse's comparative dimensionality allows it to impact desert
analysis in a way that guilt cannot. Remorse exacts a punishment
within the rongdoer,"0 much like guilt, but with greater force14' and
of a quality that can have meaning in a retributive scheme. Perhaps
this is why in almost every jurisdiction an expression of remorse for a
violation of criminal law is treated as a mitigating circumstance.' A
1,7 Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity, and Expec-
tancies About Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 291, 291
(2000);Juni, supra note 123, at 79; see alsoJORAM GRAF HABER, FORGIVENESS 90 (1991)
(describing repentance as the dual act of repudiating the wrong and vowing not to re-
peat it).
"' - [R] emorse affects determinations of an individual's moral character and, thus,
in all likelihood, perceived internalization of the group's moral code." Gold &
Weiner, supra note 137, at 299.
1 See Stem, supra note 120, at 10 ("The acceptance of remorse anticipates an en-
larged moral-psychological landscape.").
", See Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment: An Analysis of
Popular Culture, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 168, 169 (Susan Bandes ed., 1999) (describ-
ing remorse as selpunishment that includes sorrow and empathic pain).
'41 See Dublin, supra note 133, at 165 (explaining that historically remorse was
viewed as "a torture, a heavy punishment, the heaviest to which a person can be 'con-
signed'").
"' "[R]etributive goals of punishment" are achieved and "justice has been restored
between the protagonists... [when a] confession that includes remorse as a critical
component denotes that the transgressor has suffered because of his or her action."
Gold & Weiner, supra note 137, at 291.
". See, e.g., McGahee v. State, 632 So. 2d 976, 981 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (noting
that the "trial court found the existence of four mitigating circumstances," including
"that the [defendant] has expressed some remorse for his actions"); State v. Brewer,
826 P.2d 783, 804 (Ariz. 1992) ("Remorse may be a mitigating factor if found to ex-
ist."); Clark v. State, 672 A.2d 1004, 1009 (Del. 1996) (noting that the defendant's
"remorse" was a "mitigating factor"); Parker v. State, 643 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (Fla. 1994)
(per curiam) ("Jurors also may consider remorse or repentance."); Jackson v. State,
684 So. 2d 1213, 1238 (Miss. 1996) (en banc) (holding that a "catch-all" instruction on
mitigation was sufficient to encompass evidence of "extreme remorse"); State v. Moore,
553 N.W.2d 120, 142 (Neb. 1996) (noting that "expressions of remorse for the killings"
were relevant mitigating evidence); Echavarria v. State, 839 P.2d 589, 596 (Nev. 1992)
(per curiam) (noting that the common-law right of allocution entities the defendant to
"stand before the sentencing authority and present an unswom statement in mitiga-
tion of sentence, including statements of remorse" (internal quotation omitted)); State
v. Loftin, 680 A.2d 677, 709 (N.J. 1996) ("During allocution, a defendant is permitted
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wrongdoer's desert can thereby be diminished through serving his
sentence, not in a prison of the body, but through anguish of the
mind.'4 The gold-in-the-bathtub metaphor is instructive here. Imag-
ine that for every bad act done there is a bathtub full of desert. In the
current administration ofjustice, desert is typically exhausted through
bodily punishment: the wrongdoer immerses himself in the scalding
liquid, the desert flows over the sides, and in time, even what remains
evaporates entirely. Now imagine remorse as gold. Its equivalence to
corporal punishment imbues it with displacing properties. If you put
it in the bathtub, the desert spills over the sides and less remains. The
wrongdoer suffers diminished corporal punishment, less scalding des-
to make a brief statement in order to allow the jury to ascertain that he or she is an in-
dividual capable of feeling and expressing remorse...." (internal quotation omit-
ted)); State v.Jones, 451 S.E.2d 826, 847 (N.C. 1994) ("[T]estimony that the defendant
was sorry for what he had done showed his remorse ... [and was] relevant mitigating
evidence."); State v. Rojas, 592 N.E.2d 1376, 1387 (Ohio 1992) ("[Defendant's] re-
morse and assistance to the police are mitigating factors."); Malone v. State, 876 P.2d
707, 719 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that "mitigating evidence showed... [that
the defendant] exhibited remorse for his actions"); Commonwealth v. Holland, 543
A.2d 1068, 1077 (Pa. 1988) ("[T]he demeanor of a defendant, including his apparent
remorse, is a proper factor to be considered by ajury in the sentencing phase of a capi-
tal case."); Ex parteJacobs, 843 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting that
evidence of remorse was relevant but did not require special jury instruction); State v.
Pirtle, 904 P.2d 245, 274 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (noting that "remorse for the crime"
is relevant mitigating evidence).
In some jurisdictions, mere lack of remorse is considered an aggravating circum-
stance. See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1099 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Be-
cause criminal statutes have never been.., written with sufficient particularity to take
all such factors into account, a system that metes out punishment solely on the basis of
the offense of conviction-would necessarily abstract away considerations obviously
relevant in determining an appropriate sentence."); State v. Aragon, 690 P.2d 293, 302-
03 (Idaho 1984) (noting that evidence of the defendant's "utter lack of remorse" is
relevant to determining whether the defendant "poses a continuing threat to society");
Cudjo v. State, 925 P.2d 895, 902 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996) (noting that a "defen-
dant's ... lack of remorse" is relevant to determining the statutory aggravating circum-
stance of being a continuing threat to society); Chambers v. State, 903 S.W.2d 21, 26
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (regarding evidence of lack of remorse as relevant to showing
the special circumstance that the defendant would constitute a continuing threat to
society); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 606, 619 (Va. 1992) (noting that lack
of remorse is relevant in determining "dangerousness" and "vileness"); see a1soJennings
v. State, 664 A.2d 903, 910 (Md. 1995) (holding that a remorseful defendant, having
taken the first step toward rehabilitation by accepting responsibility for his crime, may
receive a reduced sentence). But see, e.g., Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837, 842 (Fla.
1997) (per curiam) ("[L]ack of remorse is a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance
and cannot be considered in a capital sentencing."); State v. Price, 388 S.E.2d 84, 100
(N.C. 1990) ("[R]emorselessness is not a statutory aggravating circumstance and may
not be argued as such."), vacated for reconsideration, 498 U.S. 802 (1990), reinstated, 418
S.E.2d 169 (N.C. 1992).
144 Sarat, supra note 140, at 169 ("[R]emorse at least seems to call for mitigation of
punishment.").
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ert, because remorse has displaced it.
Not crucial to this argument, but interestingly, the force of re-
morse has cross-theory appeal. Those who subscribe to rehabilitation
theory like remorse because it affects character and heals the wounds
of criminality. Deterrence theorists like remorse because it can ex-
pand the aggregate good by alleviating corporal punishment, a phe-
nomenon of per se social disutility,"7 while decreasing the likelihood
of recidivism."' Expressivists like remorse because the wrongdoer re-
pudiates his wrong and rejects the very person who committed it.' 47
Social contract theorists like remorse because it reaffirms the decision
of the judiciary and thereby strengthens the legitimacy of the sover-
eign as a force in accord with natural law s Existentialists and certain
moral relativists approve of remorse because it allows the wrongdoer
to rejoin the moral community, thereby creating meaning from brute
existence.
Given this definition, Moore would now likely be revolted by Her-
rin's "shallow" self-forgiveness, not because it implicates an absence of
guilt feelings-which are themselves potentially shallow and ephem-
eral-but because it has none of the qualities of an authentic psychic
disassociation and self-flagellation' 9 associated with remorse.' 0  Re-
member, Herrin has neither separated himself from the brutal mur-
der nor from the person who committed the brutal act.'5 ' Herrin re-
fuses to wear sackcloth,'5' insisting that he has suffered enough.'
IV, SeeJeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAw 65, 66 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999) ("But all punish-
ment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil.").
14,. See Gold & Weiner, supra note 137, at 291 (indicating that "remorse signals that
the transgression will not be committed again").
47 See NICHOLAS TAvUcHIs, MEA CuLPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND
RECONCILIATION 13 (1991) (indicating that expressions of remorse "unequivocally
enunciate the existence and force of shared assumptions that authorize existing social
arrangements and demarcate moral boundaries"); see also MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra
note 47, at 25 (explaining that injuries from crime are moral ones and they carry "mes-
sages" of degradation).
Infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
See E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS 132-34 (1996) (explaining that religious tra-
ditions understand how self-flagellation cleanses sin and provokes an imminence with
the divine).
J' MOORE, supra note 17, at 145.
I:" See also JOSEPH ANTHONY AMATO II, GUILT AND GRATITUDE: A STUDY OF THE
ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY CONSCIENCE 5 (1982) (describing the "guiltless man" as
one who is involved in immoral acts but has no empathy or conscience about them).
),.2 The metaphor of the sackcloth originates in the understanding that ascetic ritu-
als may help to cleanse the conscience and drive away guilt. SeeJOHN CARROLL, GUILT:
THE GREY EMINENCE BEHIND CHARACTER, HISTORY AND CULTURE 21-22 (1985) (indi-
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Instead, Herrin has embraced the murder as his own and he is loathe
to give it up. Deep feelings of remorse (not guilt), in fact, are the only
tolerable response of a moral being. Herrin's nonvirtuous character
vitiates any justifiable downgrading of his corporal sentence.
A useful mutation of Moore's thought experiment might ask the
reader to put himself in the wrongdoer's place and imagine the extent
of his remorse, rather than his guilt. It makes good sense to attribute
increasing levels of our hypothetical remorse with actual levels of the
wrongdoer's culpability or blame because remorse is the ethical per-
spective's native repulsion for bad acts, and it is the ethical perspective
that properly valuates desert. This is, in essence, Moore's insight. But
an additional useful feature of this revised exercise might be to then
ask to what extent the criminal's actual remorse looks like our hypo-
thetical remorse. A poor fit between the moral community's hypo-
thetical remorse and the bad actor's real remorse would be indicative
of the wrongdoer's vacant moral architecture, a powerful emotional
heuristic for calibrating desert and thus determining downward or
upward departures during a sentencing hearing.
5 4
Now consider the truly remorseful wrongdoer. In the fall of 1999,
Anne Lamberson drove her ambulance at fifty miles per hour through
a red light in Brooklyn, New York, striking another car and killing
three children. 5 Prosecutors explained that, in violation of state law,
Lamberson failed to slow down and check for crossing vehicles at a
red-lit intersection. For having killed three children, Lamberson
was sentenced to five years probation. Some may think that this sen-
tence is far too light. But Angela Igwe, driver of the struck auto and
mother of the slain children, did not see it that way. Igwe was con-
vinced Lamberson would "suffer for the rest of her life [by] carrying
the memory of her responsibility for the death of [the] children, and
cating asceticism "is both intended to prevent further sinning, and therefore guilt, and
to serve as a punishment, an expiation, for past sins").
15 MooRE, supra note 17, at 146 (conveying Herrin's feeling that two years in
prison is sufficient punishment for Bonnie Garland's murder).
" See Sarat, supra note 140, at 178 (describing a function of remorse as involving
the wrongdoer "coming to view his act as we view it and, in so doing, validating our re-
sponse"); see also supra note 143 (indicating that remorse, in almost every jurisdiction,
is a mitigating circumstance of criminal sentencing and that lack of remorse can, in
certain jurisdictions, be an aggravating factor in sentencing).
1 Joseph P. Fried, Plea Lets Ambulance Driver Who Killed 3 Avoid Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 1999, at B4.
U16 Id.
M Id.
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that [is] punishment enough."'58 Lamberson's sincere remorse, her
willingness to take responsibility for the accident, and her willingness
to plea convinced the parties involved that, "in the pursuit ofjustice,"
five years of parole was an appropriate sentence.9 While under
Moore's analysis our hypothetical guilt feelings would tend to impli-
cate a significant reservoir of desert, itself demanding a much stiffer
punishment for Lamberson than five years parole, what would be
missing from the examination is an account of Lamberson's remorse,
which serves to offset initial gross calculations of desert. Because
Lamberson's remorse would look much like our hypothetical feelings
of remorse, were we in Lamberson's place, her moral architecture is
likely structured much like ours, and her desert is affected accord-
ingly. The current administration ofjustice reflects this insight in that
the more remorse Lamberson expresses, the less punishment she is
likely to suffer."" ' Remorse, or the lack thereof, has long been an im-
portant factor in calculating criminal sentences, especially capital sen-
tences.'' In Lamberson's case the people of New York, in fact, agreed
to a lighter sentence than required, based largely on expressions of
162the wrongdoer's remorse.
In circumstances markedly similar, Steven Allen Abrams
"plow[ed] his car" into an Orange County "playground packed with
', Id.
Id. Lamberson's attorney explained that an additional reason for the defen-
dant's guilt), plea was that Lamberson, having herself lost a four-year-old son, "didn't
want Ms. Igwe to have to [re-]live" the experience via trial testimony. Id.
'" See supra note 143 (explaining that in nearly everyjurisdiction remorse will serve
to downgrade punishment in capital sentencing); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1978) (holding that sentencers are allowed by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to consider, as a mitigating factor, "any aspect of a defendant's character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death").
1,I In a study of what sort of factors cause juries to impose capital sentences, lack of
remorse was found to be highly aggravating: "only the defendant's prior history of vio-
lent crime and future dangerousness were more aggravating than lack of remorse."
Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: I1hat DoJurors Think?, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1538,1561 (1998); see Chris L. Kleinke et al., Evaluation of a Rapist as a
Function of Expressed Intent and Remorse, 132J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 525, 534 (1992) (reporting
that in this study, as in previous ones, a wrongdoer's expressed remorse produced le-
niency in the minds of the decisionmakers); see also, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg,
806 F.2d 1169, 1180 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming the imposition of maximum terms of
imprisonment totaling fifty-eight years for possession of firearms, explosives, and false
identification documents based on the defendant's lack of remorse and poor potential
tor rehabilitation).
"2 Fried, supra note 155.
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children," killing a three-year-old and a four-year-old. 16 Abrams was
found guilty of first degree murder on both counts. In contrast to
Lamberson, Abrams provided no explanation for the killing and, cru-
cially, "showed no remorse."16 Also unlike Lamberson, Abrams was
sentenced to two life terms without the possibility of parole. 6 ' In re-
tributive terms, Abrams's lack of remorse provides two reasons to pun-
ish. First, Abrams's endorsement of the act is additional evidence of
his having purposefully chosen to commit it with the full force and in-
tention of his will; this impacts on the culpability aspect of desert.
Second, Abrams's vacant remorse looks nothing like our hypothetical
remorse and this means that we cannot count upon his internal moral
jurisprudence to impose any significant self-punishment. We must ac-
count for the difference by imposing additional external penalties;
this impacts upon the proportionality aspect of desert.'6"
Presuming that both Lamberson's and Abrams's outcomes were
just, the best explanation for the difference in sentencing between
them lies in their expressions of remorse, or lack thereof."' While
Abrams's lack of remorse leaves his metaphorical bathtub full, Lam-
berson's remorse helps her to disassociate and distance herself from
her bad act, reaffirm the norms of the community, and express her
heartfelt pain for the harm she has caused others.'6 The very inten-
163 Richard Marosi, Driver Who Killed 2 Children Given 2 Life Terms, L.. TIMEs, Dec.
16, 2000, at B4.
' Id.
Id. Abrams was also ordered to pay restitution for funeral expenses in the
amount of twelve thousand dollars. Id.
"56 Some have argued that the "chief aim of retributive justice [is] the repudiation
of the wrong done by the criminal." ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG & JOHN P. CONRAD, THE
DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE 25 (1983). If this is right, then it makes good sense to
punish more intensely those criminals who attach themselves to and continue to affirm
their wrongful acts.
' We can distinguish between Lamberson and Abrams on other grounds, such as
culpability and volition, if we assume that Lamberson was driving safely while Abrams
was driving recklessly or with an intent to harm others, but at least as far as Abrams is
concerned we do not know why he ran into the playground and we do not know what,
if any, intent he had to harm others. An ambulance driver who accidentally runs a
stoplight too fast facially appears less culpable than a driver who has a random off-road
collision with a playground, but appearances can be deceiving and the validity of any
analysis based largely on agnosticism is questionable. In contrast, the remorse issue is
clear-cut. Lamberson expressed overwhelming remorse while Abrams expressed none
at all.
163 See Harvey Cox, Repentance and Forgiveness: A Christian Perspective, in
REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21, 24 (Amitai Etzioni & David E. Carney
eds., 1997) ("Remorse... implies a degree of empathic pain on the part of the one
who has caused the fracture.").
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sity of Lamberson's remorse, her self-punishment, is the gold that
helps to displace desert from her tub, and offsets the need for corpo-
ral punishment. Since Lamberson's remorse matches the moral
community's and Abrams's does not, we may further infer that Lam-
berson's interior jurisprudence is robust, while Abrams's is chilled,
barren, and tending, as a matter of his fundamental character, toward
cold-blooded acts.'6 Considering the difference in sentences, five
years parole for having killed three versus two life terms without the
possibility of parole for having killed two, the expression of remorse
appears to be a very powerful signal indeed.
C. The Power of Penance
Penance is the last stage in the wrongdoer's ethical transforma-
tion. Whereas guilt and remorse were reactions to the wrongdoer's
bad acts, penance is a reaction to guilt and remorse.
The internal immolation exacted by guilt (as a gateway to re-
morse) and remorse is not an end state."" High levels of intense guilt
and remorse are unsustainable
7 ' and, moreover, they are unhealthy.
72
One of the primary lessons of the ethical perspective is that we ought
to treat others as we expect to be treated. But if all we harbor for our-
selves is unending, remorse-induced self-retribution, then in time,
remorse's once-positive transformative qualities can easily be twisted
into producing mere self-loathing, and the golden rule by which we
determine how to treat others would be likewise warped and tar-
nished. This would not be a message of kindness and compassion, but
one of cruelty and masochism. Self-loathing is antithetical to the ethi-
cal perspective, serving merely to obstruct any sort of genuine connec-
tion between people.
If remorse is to teach the wrongdoer the ethical perspective, it
cannot do so by offering mere interminable suffering. Dante's Hell is
""' See Edward P. Shafranske, The Significance of Remorse in Psychotherapy, 5
PSYCHOTHERAkW PATIENT 19, 31 (1988) ("The failure to experience remorse is signifi-
cant [because] it may be an indicator of impairments in the patient's constituent abili-
ties for empathy .....
seeDublin, supra note 133, at 164 (arguing that "one should not have to dwell in
remorse indefinitely").
"'See MADDI, supra note 3, at 57 (describing an event that produces strong guilt
and anxiety and remarking that such a state is not maintainable without madness re-
sulting).
"- See Feichtinger, supra note 121, at 41 (characterizing "the human being who
carries the guilt like a cross, who cannot forget, who cannot forgive himself" as a per-
son without a connection to fellow men).
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adorned with a warning for all those who enter to abandon hope.171
In contrast, remorse puts itself out as the agent of self-improvement,
the champion of hope for a better, more virtuous self. Second, if re-
morse is to teach kindness, it cannot do so by teaching kindness for
others but not the self.174 Such hypocrisy would belie its ethical pedi-
gree. Third, remorse offers the wrongdoer nothing at all if it cannot
offer him a way out of darkness. The project of building for one's self
a moral architecture is daunting, the process is painful, but if the end-
state promises nothing more than unending psychological anguish,
the wrongdoer's current misery would appear fairly attractive in com-
parison, and then only ascetics and masochists would ever be tempted
to begin the journey. The ethical perspective, in fact, promises more
than gloom and penance is the porthole.' 75
Thus, penance is the ultimate process of exorcising the remorse
and associated energy. 176 The wrongdoer will always experience a cer-
tain level of guilt and remorse his entire life, but self-forgiveness, after
self-immolation, is crucial to moving beyond mere punishment into
the new future.17 Herbert Morris has described the process I am call-
ing penance this way:
It is a moral good, then, that one feel contrite, that one feel the guilt
that is appropriate to one's wrongdoing, that one be repentant, that one
be self-forgiving and that one have reinforced one's conception of one-
self as a responsible being. Ultimately, then, the moral good aimed at by
[my theory] is an autonomous individual freely attached to that which is
good, those relationships with others that sustain and give meaning to a
life.
178
The ribcage-vault metaphor is instructive here. Imagine that in-
'7 DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO 34 (Mark Musa ed. & trans., Ind. Univ. Press 1995)
(1314) ("ABANDON HOPE, FOREVER, YOU WHO ENTER").
'74 See Parsons, supra note 125, at 261 ("[T)he remorseful client might often con-
sider hate and violence as undesirable and even immoral, yet fails [sic] to recognize
that self-hate is no less undesirable or immoral.... [He should] recognize [his own
humanity] and that the rules of charity and forgiveness [he] appl[ies] to others apply
to [him] as well.").
175 Aristotle's entire ethical project is predicated on the notion that the do-gooder
is made happy through his virtue. ARISTOTLE, supra note 103, at 363 ("[H]appiness is
an activity of the soul expressing complete virtue .... .").
176 "Punishment, among other things, permits purgation of guilt and ideally resto-
ration of damaged relationships." Morris, supra note 119, at 268.
1 Thomas Moore, Re-Morse: An Initiatory Disturbance of the Soul, 5 PSYCHOTHERAPY
PATIENT 83, 93 (1988) (suggesting that in the end remorse "blossoms in self-
forgiveness").
178 Morris, supra note 119 at 265.
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side the ribcage of the wrongdoer is a vault full of coal. The coal is
desert, and it pollutes the body's systems. The wrongdoer is not even
aware of the existence of the coal until and unless he experiences
guilt. Guilt is a self-reflective warning (not possessed by the nonaf-
fected wrongdoer) of unspecified internal contamination often gaha-
nizing psychological insights that may lead, eventually, to remorse.""
Remorse, at this point, can occur in two kinds of people. The first
prototype is Anne Lamberson, the New York ambulance driver, who is
essentially good at heart, an individual who tries to follow the rules
and who appears to have assumed a healthy moral architecture. In
this sort of person, remorse takes on a heated aspect, burning away
the coal, thereby downgrading her desert. This metaphor is substan-
tively similar to gold-in-the-bathtub. By eliminating a certain amount
of his desert the wrongdoer downgrades his punishment.
Remorse has a far more interesting story to tell in the context of
affecting a second sort of wrongdoer, a person more like Richard
Herrin, the murderer from New Haven, or Steven Abrams, the play-
ground killer from Orange County, a person-initially-without a cer-
tain or firm moral perspective. If remorse arises at all, it does so in
the manner of a dramatic and rare phenomenon. Remorse does not
burn the fuel in the ribcage, but instead puts the vault under pressure,
changing the coal slowly through pressure, and if successful, over
time, the force of remorse turns the coal to diamond. The exertion of
pressure over time, the predicate for any radical transformation, is
painful and exhausting, but when complete, the diamond, in contrast
to the coal, is nontoxic, beautiful, and has value in the moral econ-
omy-an interesting economy in which nothing is bought or sold but
where transactions occur with no expectation of return. Remorse en-
ergy puts the coal under pressure; the diamond is the product of pen-
ance.
Another way of discussing this transformative process in the hard-
hearted wNTongdoer is to think of penance as self-forgiveness. Chris-
tians pay penance to be forgiven by the Church. Wrongdoers pay
penance in order to forgive themselves. Self-forgiveness allows for the
sort of total transformation, symbolized by the diamond in the rib-
';" For a further discussion of the possible relationship between guilt and remorse
see CARROLL, supra note 152, at 16-17 ("Moral guilt is diagnosed above all by a person
feeling remorseful. Indeed to feel remorse is to be able to admit that I must have
acted against my conscience."); GRINBERG, supra note 11, at 52 ("An expression linked
with guilt feelings, which appears very often, is remorse." (emphasis omitted)).
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cage, that accesses a sense of compassion for others... and giving of
one's self, because as an inaugural member of the moral community,
it is a joy to do so.181 In short, self-forgiveness confers upon the
wrongdoer special insights into his identity as a complete human be-
ing, meaning a being bearing a moral perspective and an understand-
ing that, in a deep sense, others are not to be hurt any more than,
crucially, he is to hurt himself. Morris puts it this way: "The guilty
wrongdoer is not viewed as damned by his wrongful conduct to a life
forever divorced from others. He is viewed as a responsible being, re-
sponsible for having done wrong and possessing the capacity for rec-
ognizing the wrongfulness of his conduct.""2 Penance gives the
wrongdoer an opportunity to do just that.'
Critics may wonder why penance is necessary at all, given that re-
morse has already downgraded much of the wrongdoer's desert and,
apparently, catalyzed much of his transformation. This is a valid
point. But there are a number of reasons, some of them tactical-that
is, for the sake of the argument-and some of them conceptual, why
penance is important to the Transformation Thesis. First, tactically,
the Transformation Thesis is a far more powerful argument for dejus-
tifying an individual's capital sentence and for establishing that he
really is a "new man" if he has gone through penance than if he has
not.I84 The contrast is far more striking; the change illuminates a
"o See Morris, supra note 119, at 265 (explaining that punishment should allow the
wrongdoer to come to appreciate the evil in his acts so that he cultivates empathy
within himself).
181 It is important to understand that he is not paying back his debt to society or
trying to make reparations with the living victims. Atonement, unlike penance, is the
process of trying to right a wrong by paying the victim back that which was taken.
Atonement's use of the creditor/debtor metaphor is inappropriate for capital crimes,
Nietzsche has noted, because the creditor receives "pleasure" upon the repayment of
the debt; the sense in which an execution confers pleasure is the black pleasure of wit-
nessing the pain of another, and that is mere vengeance. Nietzsche, supra note 125, at
34 (indicating that the metaphor presumes that the creditor's "supreme pleasure" is
that of making another suffer); see also K.G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 138, 151 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) (arguing that retri-
bution is not to be confused with restitution as, "[iun the case of murder, restitution is
clearly impossible-we cannot get back the life that was taken-but retributive pun-
ishment is still possible").
182 Morris, supra note 119, at 268.
"3 See MuRPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 25 (indicating that true repentance is
one way to divorce the self from an evil act). While actions are important manifesta-
tions of that changed character, they are not per se required in order to "be" penitent.
See ARISTOTLE, supra note 103, at 376 (describing virtue as involving both "feelings and
actions").
1 See infra Part IIIA for a discussion of how the status of the wrongdoer as a "new
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bright line. Second, for epistemological reasons, penance serves as an
excellent marker of a wrongdoer having experienced remorse. Pen-
ance allows us to distinguish the neurotically guilty from the genuinely
remorseful because, unlike remorse, in no case do mere feelings of
guilt alone segue into diamond-hearted transformation. Third, as dis-
cussed in more detail above, penance explains how and why the
wrongdoer would not and should not suffer in perpetuity. Absent
such an explanation, the Transformation Thesis might present itself
as a scheme more cruel than the penalty it attempts to commandeer.
And last, penance provides incentives for wrongdoers tempted to
change themselves for the better, while simultaneously answering ob-
jections that rational actors would never choose transformation over
nontransformation. Penance can explain why, in the long run, the
sackcloths and self-reproach, the near-obsessive, masticating, reas-
sessment of one's identity and relationship to others, and the appar-
ently endless interior immolation, in the end, are worth it.
Ill. JUSTIFYING THE TRANSFORMATION THESIS
As a preliminary matter it may be useful to examine why the
Transformation Thesis is, broadly speaking, so intuitively attractive.
At the heart of Kantian theory is the idea that, as distinguished from
mere "things,"" we should treat others as "persons" "6 with the respect
and consideration due them."7 Other people are, in their central be-
ings, free acting agents exactly like ourselves.88 Rawlsian ethical the-
ory orbits around a similar premise. For Rawls it comes out "equaljus-
man" affects his proper desert.
1' "Any object of free choice which itself lacks freedom is therefore called a
thing...." KLNT, supra note 43, at 50.
J- A "person" is "a subject whose actions can be imputed to him," and a moral per-
sonality is "nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws." Id.
" S'e IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPFWSIC OF MORALS 96 (H.J.
Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1785) ("Act in such a way that you always
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never sim-
ply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.").
"' All external qualities including our "character," our "[plower, wealth, honour,
even health," and our other virtues, such as "[m]oderation in affections and passions,
self-control, and sober reflexion," are but baggage to our central autonomous selves,
our "good will" as rational actors. Id. at 61. Furthermore, we are all identical in the
w~ays that really matter. we are all bound by the same functions of moral duty, id. at 65,
we are to treat each other identically in the kingdom of ends, id. at 101, and we all
achieve or fail to achieve autonomy, id. at 98, and dignity, id. at 102, in the exact same
way. And although we are unequal in our "possessions, power.... opportunities....
talent, industry, and luck," we should stand in exactly the same place with regard to
our "legal rights." ROGERJ. SULLWVAN, IMMANUEL KANT'S MORAL THEORY 256 (1989).
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tice."' s By this he means that equality must be our paramount value"'
and we should treat each other, first and foremost, as human beings
without regard to our inborn advantages, our native skills, our physi-
cal or psychological traits, or various other qualities that might make
our passage in this world, in comparison to one another, easier or
more difficult.'9' Rawls wants to say that we cannot claim our charac-
teristics and, by implication, we are not our characteristics. 92 Instead,
we are, in our central selves, but a pinpoint presence, a spot of pre-
conscious sentience, and we are all identical and interchangeable in
this way.
I believe Kant and Rawls got it right. 93 The important point here
is not that we should reserve a second chance for the worst of our
criminals because their rights as human beings stand in equality with
those of noncriminals. Criminals, of course, do enjoy all the natural
rights of all human beings, but this is no bar, necessarily, to their be-
RAwLs, supra note 34, at 443.
See id. at 10 (indicating that his theory of "justice as fairness" is predicated upon
a thought experiment that sets the parameters of a fair society based on what decisions
"free and rational persons" would make about the form of their government if they
were thrust into "an initial position of equality").
IN Rawls is fond of saying "[n]o one deserves his greater natural capacity nor mer-
its a more favorable starting place in society." Id. at 87. He suggests that we treat each
other first as people and second as people with qualities, and furthermore, that we
ought to construct a society that advantages the worse off in order to pay respect to this
principle. See id. at 88 ("Injustice as fairness men agree to avail themselves of the acci-
dents of nature and social circumstance only when doing so is for the common bene-
fit.").
192 'Ae do not deserve our place in the distribution of native endowments, any
more than we deserve our initial starting place in society. That we deserve the
superior character that enables us to make the effort to cultivate our abilities is
also problematic; for such character depends in good part upon fortunate
family and social circumstances in early life for which we can claim no credit.
Id. at 89. In contrast, Rawls seems perfectly happy to give us credit for our virtue, or
moral worth, which he correlates with "effort, or perhaps better, conscientious effort."
Id. at 274.
14' Their premises may be distinguishable in some ways, but they are similar to at
least this extent: our attitudes and positions relative to each other, and our obligations
and rights, are perfectly reflective. Compare SULLIVAN, supra note 188, at 5 (explaining
that Kant's "moral law is objective and not person dependent; it holds universally,
without regard for any contingent conditions that may subjectively differentiate one
person from another"), with RAWLS, supra note 34, at 442 (indicating that the "basis of
equality" resides in the condition of moral persons "capable of having... a conception
of their good.., and.., capable of having.., a sense of justice" and of applying the
"principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree"). Whatever differences
may exist between Kant and Rawls, it is enough for my purposes that both of these phi-
losophers recognize the rich, abiding similarities, if not connections, among and be-
tween people.
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ing denied a second chance, nor to their suffering a deserved execu-
tion."" The essential point, instead, is that underlying Kantian and
Rawlsian theory is an observation about the nature of the individual
self as being, when unadorned and undeveloped, identical to all
selves, and, crucially, as forming the bedrock of autonomy and human
dignity. Some have suggested that it is this ineluctable bedrock that
forestalls the imposition of capital punishment upon even the most
egregious of wrongdoers/4 This argument is not entirely unattractive,
but it is not mine. This bedrock, or "pinpoint" as I have been calling
it, simply allows for the possibility of human dignity upon the manifes-
tation of normative behavior. Kant specifically makes allowance for
the possibility that our behavior, when atrocious enough, can snuff
out the very dignity that identifies us as human, and would thereby
justify our execution."' In other words, human dignity is not a per-
fecfly durable atom, unbreakable as a metaphysical principle, always
defeating any attempt to apply a justified capital sentence. We can,
and sometimes do, turn ourselves into monsters. My view of the na-
ture of the self, and the first principle of the Transformation Thesis, is
simply that, when given the chance, we can also turn ourselves back.
While death penalty abolitionists might overestimate the durabil-
ity of human dignity, death penalty advocates seem to underestimate
dignity's ability to awaken itself after a long slumber. Supporters of
capital punishment appear to want to separate themselves from capital
prisoners who are sometimes characterized as subhuman, or mon-
sters, irredeemably evil, perhaps even born that way.1, 7 But, as against
"", Seevan den Haag, supra note 29, at 1668 (arguing that outright rejections of the
death penalty based on blanket notions of human dignity "can be neither corrobo-
rated nor refuted" but are "article[s] of faith").
"' See Morris, supra note 119, at 270 (articulating a "paternalistic" theory that an-
swers the charge that a murderer "forfeit[s] his right to life by murdering" because
"one's status as a moral being" implies "non-waivable, non-forfeitable, non-
relinquishable right[s]'); see also van den Haag, supra note 29, at 1668 (articulating and
then anw'ering the argument that all human beings have "an imprescriptible ... right
to life" that in every instance defeats the death penalty).
"" Kant explains that "humanity ... is the only thing which has dignity," but only
"so far as it is capable of morality." KANT, supra note 187, at 102. He further explains
that "every murderer... must suffer death" because "this is what justice ... wills in ac-
cordance with universal laws." KANT, supra note 43, at 143. Thus, murder is immoral
and, presuming that universal laws are prohibited from executing rational agents act-
ing in dignity, it stands to reason that a wrongdoer surrenders his dignity through kill-
ing.
>" Camus suggests that executions are expressions by society that the criminal is
absolutely and incorrigibly evil. ALBERT CAMUS, RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH
225-26 (Justin O'Brien trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1960) (1957).
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the abolitionists, this view is equally flawed for at least two reasons.
First, it denies the identical normative ontology in us all (pinpoint
parallelism). Capital prisoners may have lost their way, but this is not
to say that any one of us would not or could not have ended up in the
same place, given a similar starting position and similar events. We
are all born with the same pinpoint sentience, with the same capacity
for good or evil, and, crucially, with parallel vulnerability to cosmic
chance. Second, the death penalty advocate's view denies the plausi-
bility of two-way transformation. Even presuming that expressions of
criminality can change people into monsters, there appears no facial
reason why countervailing expressions of compassion should not be
able to turn monsters back into people. That criminality would be a
one-way street fails to completely comprehend the full capacity of the
human self. The Transformation Thesis is appealing as against these
counterintuitive and, some might say, small-minded descriptions of
the self and the human dignity within.
There are other, less abstract reasons why the Transformation
Thesis, within the context of capital punishment in particular, is so at-
tractive. First, as a social policy matter, a transformation symboli-
cally"g8 legitimizes the social contract. When a murderer concedes
fault, he reaffirms the judgment of the judiciary.' This is no small
matter. In South Africa, for example, Nelson Mandela helped to top-
ple an entire government, at least partially, by rejecting the judgment
of his nation's courts and maintaining constant opposition to the le-
gitimacy of his imprisonment. 2°° Each prisoner's recalcitrance, in its
own small way, calls into question the sovereign's right to rfle2 ' and,
'' Symbols matter because "symbols and myths are an expression of man's unique
self-consciousness, his capacity to transcend the immediate concrete situation and see
his life in terms of 'the possible.' ... [T] his capacity is one aspect of his experiencing
himself as a being having a world." Rollo May, The Meaning of the Oedipus Myth, in
GUILT: MAN & SOCIETY 171, 171 (Roger W. Smith ed., 1971).
14 See WALTER MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 287 (1968) (indicating that
it is not enough that we simply kill the body but that an execution seeks to extract re-
morse from the prisoner such that he would "realize that he had against him right as
well as might").
The government continued to negotiate with Mandela for his release because
his imprisonment had become more of a liability than a benefit. See NELSON
MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 454 (1994) (noting that the rejection of violence
as a political instrument formed one of the more important subjects of negotiation).
From prison, Mandela negotiated with then-president F.W. de Klerk for his own re-
lease, the release of fellow political prisoners, and the dismantling of apartheid. Id. at
482-83. Eventually, he was successful on all counts. Id. at 539 (recapitulating the story
of de Klerk's and apartheid's defeat in late 1992).
2,, Locke has argued that the sovereign loses his authority to command when he
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conversely, when the prisoner retracts his complaint, the issue as to
the moral validity of the law or legal process that condemns him is no
longer at issue.11-2
Second, the way in which the sovereign responds to a wrongdoer's
character conversion sends a message to its citizens as to its self-
conception. When a wrongdoer, through sheer force of will, trans-
forms himself, he can no longer be considered so worthless, so unre-
deemably evil that his execution would not thereby maculate the
community." A death penalty carried out in the face of clear evi-
dence of radical character transformation and associated penance is
evidence of a society that does not expect, seek, nor value such a re-
sponse from its wrongdoers .2' Such a society does not take seriously
the personal autonomy required for such a transformation 2 1 and is
quick to execute even in the face of inadequate desert.
2°6
Third, a prisoner's ethical transformation is often significant to
the living victims. Sister Helen Prejean, for example, reports that
Lloyd Le Blanc attended the execution of his son's murderer inter-
ested only in hearing an apology.27 This was more important to LeBlanc than the execution itself. Expressions of a murderer's guilt and
"endeavour[s] to take away and destroy the property of the people .... to reduce them
to slavery under arbitrary power," or to otherwise destroy them. LOCKE, supra note 40,
at 110. An execution, absent justification, is an exercise of that very sort of unauthor-
ized power. A prisoner's resistance is one man's vote for having found the state to be
acting as a mere tyrant. Where the state acts with justification, however, the execution
serves to reject "apathy, disrespect, and violence[, the] means of social sabotage."
Roger W. Smith, The Political Meaning of Unconscious Guilt, in GUILT: MAN & SOCIETY
185, 188 (Roger W. Smith ed., 1971). The execution of an unapologetic, unconverted
prisoner may be understood as a society's legitimate attempt at self-preservation.
- See John G. Osborn, Legal Philosophy and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory
Interplitation, 36 1-LkRv. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 125 (1999) ("In essence, though, natural law
theory can be reduced to one central argument: morality is the watermark against
which to assess any s)stem of positive law.").
.. See WILLat TEMPLE, THE ETHics OF PENAL ACTION 31-32 (1934) (arguing that
it is immoral to treat a man as if he were "wholly identified with evil" unless he really
is).
-",, See VAN DEN HAAG & CONRA), supra note 166, at 27 (arguing that execution ex-
presses the ultimate rejection of reconciliation).
'-" See Morris, supra note 119, at 266 (arguing that the goal of punishment must be
to take seriously the notion of "morally autonomous individual[s) attached to the
good").
... Morris makes two important points on this issue. First, he explains that pun-
ishment wshere desert is absent only serves to "baffle our moral understanding and
threaten what is so often already precarious" in our society. Id. at 268. Second, he ar-
gues outright that the death penalty is cruel because it destroys the character of an
autonomous individual and thus "destroy[s] one's capacity for rejecting what is evil
and again attaching oneself to the good." Id. at 270.
," HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING 244 (1993).
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remorse appear to affect the living victims in far more salutary ways
than the illusory closure of witnessing the execution. " " In another
case, Prejean specifically discusses the empty pleasure of having wit-
nessed the execution of a loved one's killer: "[W]ith [the killer,]
Robert Willie[,] dead, [the victim's father] doesn't have an object for
his rage. He's been deprived of that, too. I know that he could watch
Robert killed a thousand times and it could never assuage his grief.""""
Prejean writes, "[o]nly reconciliation. . accepting [the victim's]
death ... can finally release [the family] to leave the past and join the
present, ... to rejoin the ranks of the living."M1 0 For the surviving fam-
ily, a prisoner's ethical conversion, or at the very least, expression of
remorse and penance, may be among the most reparative acts avail-
able. 1 '
Finally, an ethical transformation reaffirms hope in us all.12 A
scholar who once worked on San Quentin's (California's largest
maximum security prison) death row writes, "[tihe whole enterprise
of criminology must be based on the optimistic assumption that all of
us, even the most vicious, can be improved. If we deny that assump-
tion as to a few whose actions have especially horrified us, we call into
question its applicability to everyone else."213 It is, therefore, impor-
tant to leave the possibility of change and redemption open to death
211row prisoners, not for their sakes, but largely for our own. Moreo-
ver, a moral community only coheres to the extent to which it resists
2" Opposite to the principle of healing, some argue that the death penalty has a
destructive effect. See, e.g., ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE
PERSPECTIVE 119-20 (1989) (explaining that the brutalization hypothesis forwards that
"the message given by executions stimulates, rather than inhibits, violence, and specifi-
cally condones killing as vengeance").
PREJEAN, supra note 207, at 226. Bud Welch, who lost his daughter in the 1995
Oklahoma City federal building bombing, requested that Timothy McVeigh not be
executed because, as Archbishop EusebiusJ. Beltran said, "the death penalty perpetu-
ates a terrible cycle of violence, diminishes respect for human life and ultimately fails
to ease the pain of those who grieve." Catholics Speak Out Against Death for McVeigh,
NAT'L CATH. REP.,July 4, 1997, at 9.
210 PREJEAN, supra note 207, at 226.
21 See Gold & Weiner, supra note 137, at 293 (positing that a remorseful confession
with relevance to victims is likely to be beneficial).
212 Winston Churchill expressed the hope as the possibility that there is a "treas-
ure ... in the heart of every man." Henry Weihofen, Punishment and Treatment: Reha-
bilitation, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 255, 262 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971).
213 VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, supra note 166, at 43.
214 One thinker has suggested that the way in which we deal with punishment as a
culture is really about "humankind's fall from grace" and our success or failure here
speaks to "our prospects for redemption." Sarat, supra note 140, at 171.
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disconnecting itself from those who seek to reject its norms and
laws. / ' It is our hope for the betterment of others that congeals our
community.1 " To suggest that some are beyond hope and not worth
saving is to suggest that hope and salvation are finite resources. Today
there is not enough for them; tomorrow there will not be enough for
us. It is our allowance for the transformation of the worst among us
that increases the possibility for hope, as a community and as indi-
viduals, to be our best selves and to be better today than we were yes-
terday. Only within this context may we each flourish and develop
personally and interpersonally. 217 And the mechanism of our own ele-
vation is cheapened and corrupted when we believe it cannot extend,
or we will not extend it, to those who need it most.
Dwelling for a moment on this last discrete issue, an important
counterargument should be considered. Critics might argue that for
all this zeal to rescue people who kill people, conspicuously absent is
any palpable compassion or sympathy for the dead victim and his fam-
ily. Why extend chance after chance to those who robbed their vic-
tims of any and every chance? This is perhaps one of the toughest
concerns to answer, but the argument's flaw is in its dubious premise:
we can go back. In fact, there is no going back. Every moral decision
and every meaningful action must make do with the here-and-now, no
matter how unpleasant.2' s Because the victim cannot be brought back,
the here-and-now of a murder is something permanent and unfix-
able."" To suggest that we can somehow "get even" by taking a life for
"' See VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, supra note 166, at 27 ("When that retaliation
takes the form of execution, the community makes it clear that it expects neither
atonement nor reconciliation."). An execution denies any connection between us and
the wrongdoer, insisting that we are not equally "capable of veering" away from the
good. Id. For that, "[w]e are all the losers." Id.
, Upon the commission of a crime it is the place of punishment to "weld a man
back into the chain of eternal obligations which bind every human being to every
other one." CARROLL, supra note 152, at 217. We make our community whole by giv-
ing the wrongdoer the opportunity to expiate his guilt. See id. (remarking that Raskol-
nikov need not be punished as he has found shame and guilt).
M Nicola Lacey argues that a society must be not only concerned about promoting
the autonomy of its citizens but equally concerned about creating an "environment in
which human beings may flourish and develop." LAcEY, supra note 34, at 198-99. This
notion is "central" to a successful theory ofpunishment. Id.
"' See Raymond Studzinski, Transcending a Past: From Remorse to Reconciliation in the
Aging Process, 5 PSYCHOTHERAPY PATIENT 207, 215 (1988) ("Hoping is not wishing that
the past had been different. Rather, hope arises precisely in the face of the inalterabil-
ity of the past.").
' ,, See AEscH LUs, THE ORESTEIA 260 (Robert Fagles trans., Penguin Books 1977)
(458 B.C.) (explaining that "once the dust drinks down a man's blood, he is gone,
once and for all .... [and there is n]o rising back").
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a life in some algebraic blood equation 22 is to painfully misunderstand
the permanence of death, and is furthermore to perpetuate an un-
healthy, if not childlike, delusion of our own grandeur. To live in the
here-and-now of a murder is not to ask ourselves how we might get
even, but to ask ourselves how to best extract meaning from a sense-
less act and how to best honor the memory of an innocent victim.
Presuming we are in the presence of an ethically transformed
wrongdoer, we have the opportunity to effectuate one of two worlds.
In the first world, we can ignore the precepts of retributive justice and
choose to kill yet again, marking the memory of the innocent with two
bodies in the ground and blood on all our hands.22" ' In the second
world, we can take the opportunity of a murder to reaffirm our love
for one another, as a community, and our abiding faith in the innate
goodness of man-his ability to change, become better and rejuve-
nate. If we can look in the face of a murderer and recognize nascent
humanity, then we truly have become a community that seeks nothing
less than to live up to all of our highest values. In the first world we
become our worst selves, in the second world we become our best.
And considering that there is no getting even, there is no going back,
choosing among the two should be easy.
This is not to say, of course, that the execution of a wrongdoer
2,o But see KANr, supra note 43, at 142 (suggesting that there is a mythological sig-
nificance to punishing wrongdoers and arguing that even if civil society were to be dis-
banded we would still be morally obligated to execute the murderer or be considered
"collaborators in this public violation of justice"); cf George P. Fletcher, The Place of
Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 51, 60 (1999) (explaining that
"blood guilt" is the biblical notion that the "ongoing disorder" in the universe caused
by a crime can only be redressed through proper punishment).
Within a retributive scheme, the deep problem with blood guilt is that it smacks of
vengeance. KANT, supra note 43, at 278 (explaining that "blood guilt" cannot be al-
lowed to "come upon [the] land" because "[b]lood innocently shed cries out for
vengeance [and c]rime cannot remain unavenged"). Vengeance, of course, runs en-
tirely contrary to the central principles of retributivejustice. MOBERLY, supra note 199,
at 101-02 (distinguishing retributive justice from vengeance in that retributivism is
(1) disinterested, "neither selfish nor malevolent," and (2) impersonal, expressing "an-
tagonism first and foremost towards the wrong as such and only indirectly and inciden-
tally towards the person of the wrongdoer so far as he embodies the wrong"); see also
MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 137 (distinguishing the "vengeful hater" who
seeks to destroy the wrongdoer for personal satisfaction, and the retributivist who seeks
merely to assert the moral truth of desert); John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic
Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 307 (1998) (explaining that revenge is
not a permissible reason for acting and that we should never "answer evil with evil").
?21 Nietzsche recommends: "[Llet us not become darker ourselves on [criminals']
account, like all those who punish others and feel dissatisfied. Let us sooner step
aside. Let us look away." FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 254 (Walter Kauf-
mann trans., Random House 1974) (1887).
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who deserves it would not be justified, but rather to take issue with ex-
actly what is meant by "desert" in the first instance. Desert must not
encompass only the specific instance of the crime, but it also must
evaluate post hoc character as well. As argued more fully above, this is
not only a well-entrenched aspect of current sentencing hearing pro-
cedureza but the right thing to do.2  Moreover, as the above discus-
sion illustrates, more than a few instrumental goods are advanced by
recognizing character transformation: the legitimation of the social
compact, expression of positive state self-conception, benefits to living
victims, and the affirmation of hope. Instrumental goods are not in-
dependent reasons for embracing the Transformation Thesis, but
might serve to tip the scale where one is in perfect equipoise between
a character-driven and a non-character-driven theory of punishment.
That is, if both theories seem perfectly and evenly plausible, then in-
strumental goods argue for the theory here.
It is from these intuitions that the Transformation Thesis grows.
What follows is a structured argument for the notion that we should
commute ' death sentences when a prisoner experiences an authentic
ethical transformation (the "Transformation Thesis"). Given the
framework set out in the above discussion, capital punishment cannot
be deserved where the prisoner has undergone an authentic ethical
conversion-as demarcated by remorse and penance-for three rea-
sons: (1) as a "new man" the converted does not deserve the punish-
ment prescribed to "another;" (2) the converted's remorse and pen-
ance prorates the external punishment deserved; and (3) under the
proportionality thesis, penultimate desert cannot justify the ultimate
punishment.
", Supra note 143; see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) ("[W]e conclude
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the
rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.").
See supra Part I.B.
" For the sake of convenience, this Comment uses the language of "commuting"
the death sentence, which tends to imply a sentence decrease to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. In most cases, this would likely be ajust outcome, but
only a retributive analysis in any particular instance would be able to come to any
grounded conclusions. For a more detailed analysis as to why life sentences are an ac-
ceptable alternative to capital punishment in the opinion of most Americans, and how
such a s)stem might be implemented, see David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alter-
native to Capital Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1998).
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A. New Man
Joram Haber describes the bad actor's character transformation
using language with which we are all intuitively familiar: "[T]he
wrongdoer can in some sense become a new person... [and] the per-
son [he] was who committed the wrong [becomes] nothing more
than a metaphysical shadow.",2  Austin Sarat similarly describes the
remorseful offender as "in an important sense, a changed, perhaps a
different, person."226  Likewise, just prior to her execution, noted
pickaxe murderer Karla Faye Tucker was described as "not the same
227person," having experienced her religious conversion. Strong lan-
guage like this can be found in much of the literature about remorse-
ful, penitent wrongdoers and cannot, I think, be simply dismissed as
hyperbole. It reflects important intuitions about identity, responsibil-
ity,2' s and the possibility for "moral rebirth" through the repudiation
of past acts and past selves.22" Even Kant, the godfather of retributive
justice, recognized that through repentance a new birth is in fact pos-
sible and that our new selves would not, largely, deserve punishment
for the transgressions of our old selves.2 °
Think of Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov, a murderer who over time
comes to regret what he has done, develops a sense of remorse, and
changes his fundamental moral perspective. 231' The murderer begins
225 HABER, supra note 137, at 96.
'6 Sarat, supra note 140, at 170.
227 BEVERLY LOWRY, CROSSED OVER 14 (1992); see also Mike Ward & Rebecca Rod-
riguez, Tucker's Life Ends Amid Prayers for Forgiveness, Demands for Justice AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Feb. 4, 1998, at Al (reporting that as far as George W. Bush and the pa-
role board were concerned, conversion was not sufficient to prevent her execution.);
cf Hannity & Colmes: Karla Faye Tucker Case (Fox News television broadcast, Feb. 2,
1998), 1998 WL 29778459 ("[I]f anyone deserved to have her sentence commuted on
the basis of mercy or rehabilitation, I believe she is the fit candidate.").
22 See A.C. EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT 97 (1929) ("It is generally ad-
mitted that recognition of one's sin in some form or another is a necessary condition
of real moral regeneration .... ").
HABER, supra note 137, at 96; see also MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 25
(indicating that repentance is one way to divorce the self from an evil act).
20 IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 64-65 (Theo-
dore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., Harper & Row 1960) (1792).
2"1 The hero, Rodion Romanovitch Raskolnikov, finds hope in the very suffering of
his anticipated seven-year prison sentence: "[He] had seven more years before [him],
and what unbearable sufferings and infinite happiness those years would hold! But he
was restored to life and he knew it and felt to the full all his renewed being
FYODOR DosTOEVSKy, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 526 (Jessie Coulson ed., Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1995) (1866); see also Shafranske, supra note 169, at 31 ("[,Without re-
morse ... the person is unable to become a new self and to transcend the limitations
of past modes of being in the world.").
RESURRECTION FROM A DEATH SENTENCE
to see the murder not as a personal triumph but as the nexus of an in-
tense shame." In this story the crime becomes the punishment and a
new man is born with a moral outlook entirely foreign to his former
self.'- By the end of the novel the reader gains a sense of the waste-
fulness involved in Raskolnikov's punishment, a wastefulness that per-
haps justifies his unusually short sentence of seven years,2- and per-
haps explains why the reader does not feel that the sentence is too
light. To the contrary, much like the NewYork ambulance driver, our
sense is that the minimal sentence is more than offset by Raskolnikov's
shame, remorse, and newfound compassion for others.23  In some
ways we feel that Raskolnikov understands his desert and proper pun-
ishment on an order of magnitude many times greater than the state
and its mechanically applied sentence ever could. With diamonds en-
sconced in the ribcage, his insights are those of a man who has seen
darkness and then light, and knows, perhaps better than most, the dif-
ference between the two.
The technical retributive argument here is not too complicated
and is concededly less illuminating than more impressionistic medita-
tions on Raskolnikov's character shift, but it is as follows. Any analysis
of desert begins with identity. The first question is, "to whom is the
desert ascribed?,2'1 When identity changes through character trans-
formation, the desert of the old man attaches less clearly, if at all, to
the new man. Perhaps some desert gets lost in the transition, or per-
haps desert is identity-specific. Perhaps we own, as Rawls says, only
those attributes most closely related to our most willful attempts to act
in viciousness or virtue 237 and old nonvirtuous acts are no longer sig-
nificant to individuals who no longer trace their connection, as selves,
" Raskolnikov expresses his revulsion for himself this way, "Finally, I am a louse
because... I myself am, perhaps, even worse and viler than the louse I killed, and I
knew btforehand that I should tell myself so after I had killed her! Can anything com-
pare with such horror? Oh, platitudes! What baseness!" DOSTOEVSIK, supra note 231,
at 264.
"-, One theorist has described Dostoevsky's conception of remorse this way: "Dos-
toevsky's is a moral theory-it condemns the very readiness to 'step over the blood'
and points to the moral and spiritual consequences of the crime as the worst punish-
ment for the perpetrator." Vera Bergelson, Crimes and Defenses ofRodion Raskolnikov, 85
KY. L.J. 919, 951 (1996-1997).
,1 DosiOErVsKr supra note 231, at 513, 527.
" "For centuries, the positive role of remorse in bringing about religious conver-
sion has been recognized." Studzinski, supra note 218, at 212.
" That "whom" would be our character. Aristotle argued that our characters
make us who wve are. ARISTOTLE, supra note 103, at 350-60.
N RrLs, supra note 34, at 274.
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to them. Whatever explanation turns out to be true, the central point
is the same: to the extent that the new man really is a different per-
son, 3 8 he should not be punished, in full, for the bad acts of the per-
239son he once was.
B. Remorse and Penance Downgrade Desert
Jeffrie Murphy declares, "The repentant person has a better char-
acter than the unrepentant person, and thus the repentant per-
son. . simply deserves less punishment than the unrepentant per-
son."240  Character retributivism calls for an examination of the
convict's whole moral being in order to calculate desert properly. De-
sert, as we have discussed, is diminished or downgraded through re-
morse and penance. One way of dissecting this phenomenon is by
thinking of remorse as gold that displaces the desert in the criminal's
bathtub, in essence offsetting the need for corporal punishment
though the grief- and anguish-producing aspects of authentic re-
morse. Punishment of the body, in a retributive scheme, is prorated
by the wrongdoer's self-imposed punishment of the mind.
A second way of thinking about remorse's desert-diminishing
qualities is by examining its effect on those individuals, like the New
York ambulance driver, who have already adopted the moral perspec-
tive.24' For these people desert is coal that can be, to some extent,
burned away through the expression of remorse. On this account,
part of what the wrongdoer "deserves" is to know the depth of his
wrong through the condemnation of the moral community. Some
felons suffer the full force of the moral community's condemnation
and never acquire that knowledge. But if the wrongdoer, like the New
York ambulance driver, has already acquired a deep understanding of
the pain caused to others by his actions, and as a result of that wrong-
doer's connection to the community feels that pain inside himself,
then less desert remains than would otherwise. In this case remorse
238 See HABER, supra note 137, at 96 (indicating that one may experience "moral
rebirth").
2'9 Of the transformed murderer William Neal Moore, a cellmate remarked, "[i]f
you kill him today, you're killing a body, but a body with a different mind. It would be
like executing the wrong man." Bill Montgomery, Even Murder Victim's Kin Urge Mercy
for Inmate, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 21, 1990, atAl.
2'0 Murphy, supra note 46, at 157.
241 See Kenneth Gorelick, lWielder of Many Swords: Remorse and Its Transmutations, 5
PSYCHOTHERAPY PATIENT 219, 227 (1988) ("Remorse is an internalized feeling. It re-
quires the development of the capacity to identify with a separate other as having the
same worth and feelings as the self.").
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does not transform the wrongdoer so much as reaffirm existing nor-
mative principles. Nonetheless, it is useful in explaining remorse's re-
lationship to desert and as a contrast against the third method for
thinking about remorse and penance's relationship to desert.
That third method is to think of remorse as exerting pressure on
coal in the ribcage vault. Over time the desert is transformed and
thereby diminished, while simultaneously providing the base sub-
stance for a change of heart. The process-what I am calling pen-
ance-of transforming one into an autonomous individual of compas-
sion filled with diamond-like inner radiance instead of toxic blame,
exorcises desert and thereby calls for a prorating of external punish-
ment. A failure to readjust punishment of the body after a transfor-
mation of the mind would be a failure under retributivism's propor-
tionality doctrine to punish according to, and in strict measure with,
desert.
A nonfictitious example of remorse and penance is instructive
here. Paul Crump killed a security guard during a bank robbery. 
2 2
Over the course of his time on death row, Crump underwent a "char-
acter metamorphosis" working in the prison's convalescent hospital.
243
According to one guard, Crump became "mother, father, priest and
social worker" to fifty inmates, including problem prisoners and in-
mates who needed protection from other prisoners.2-" This pattern is
typical of the genuine penitent: he actually wants to affect the world
positively by engaging in the force of creation instead of destruction.4
Two days before Crump's scheduled execution, Illinois Governor Otto
Kerner was persuaded that Crump was not the man he once was and
commuted the death sentence to 199 years imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.216 Some might call Kerner's commutation an ex-
" See People v. Crump, 147 N.E.2d 76 (11. 1957) (per curiam) (affirming convic-
tion and sentence upon retrial).
"' Dight Aarons, Getting Out of This Mess: Steps Toward Addressing and Avoiding In-
ordinateDela'V in Capital Cases, 89J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 37 (1998).
" Ronald Bailey, Rehabilitation on Death Row, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
556,561 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1964).
" in contrast, some argue that altruistic emotions are "intrinsically valuable, in the
sense that they are morally good apart from whether they actually issue in beneficent
action." JUSTIN OAKLEY, MORALITY AND THE EMOTIONS 73 (1992) (internal quotation
omitted).
M-" ichael B. Lavinsky, Executive Clemency: Study of a Decisional Problem Arising in the
Terminal Stages of the Criminal Process, 42 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 13, 43-44 (1965). Other no-
table death row prisoners who have been transformed include Willie Lee Richmond,
sor State v. Richmond, 886 P.2d 1329 (Ariz. 1994) (modifying Richmond's sentence to
life without parole for, among other reasons, his rehabilitation and religious conver-
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pression of mere supererogatory mercy, but this underestimates the
more basic, if not more subtle, truth that changed convicts like Crump
deserve their reduced sentences.
C. Penultimate Desert
The death penalty is the ultimate sanction.247 The nature of the
crime, the seriousness of the punishment, and our notions about per-
sonal responsibility demand that we apply the death penalty only un-
der the most principled theory of punishment, retributive justice. 48
This is not only a widely held belief, but an important feature of the
Court's capital jurisprudence.149 With near exclusivity, the principle of
desert articulated by retributivism justifies (if any principle can) the
application of capital sentences upon the worst of our criminal of-
fenders.5 0 If retributive principles fail to justify the death penalty in
any particular application, no justification is sufficient. And as we
have seen, the transformed prisoner downgrades his desert and
changes his character in ways radical enough to call for the prorating
of punishment under the maxim of proportionality. If retributivism,
and only retributivism, justifies any given application of the ultimate
punishment as a moral response to having committed the ultimate
crime, 25' then when a significant portion of the criminal's desert is re-
lieved or otherwise exorcised through transformation and its associ-
ated properties, no sufficient normative justification for the capital
22sentence any longer obtains. Put another way, mere penultimate
desert cannotjustify the ultimate punishment.Z
3
sion), and Caryl Chessman, see People v. Chessman, 341 P.2d 679, 684 (Cal. 1959) (af-
firming a conviction for crimes as the Red Light Bandit). Unlike Crump, Chessman
was not so lucky. Despite a habeas appeal, he was executed in 1960. WILuIM M.
KUNSTLER, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT? THE ORIGINAL TRIAL OF CARYL CHESSMAN
286-88 (1961).
217 See van den Haag, supra note 29, at 1662 (writing, in an article entitled The Ulti-
mate Punishment, "[t ] he death penalty is our harshest punishment").
248 See supra Parts I.B-C (describing retributive justice as the principal, if not sole,
justification for the death penalty and character retributivism as the most powerful it-
eration of that theory).
.49 Supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
See McCord, supra note 224, at 6 ("I believe [retributive justice] is a natural and
acceptable justification for punishment-indeed, the most powerful justification in
highest condemnation cases."); supra Part I.B.
zI See McCord, supra note 224, at 22 (discussing the elements of a "highest con-
demnation case").
252 "The deserts-limitation principle," as it has been called, "requires that those who
do not deserve the sanction be spared." Howe, supra note 28, at 832.
233 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 94, at 372 (describing the Court's "narrowing"
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An additional important point is that the new man must not be
disadvantaged just because he has come to his ethical awakening post-
sentencing. Morally cognizant people, like Anne Lamberson, are, in a
sense, advantaged twice for having expressed their sense of remorse
before their capital sentencing hearing. First, were the law to recog-
nize ethical transformations, Lamberson-like wrongdoers who are sen-
tenced to life, not death, due to expressions of remorse at their sen-
tencing hearings, avoid the hopelessness, despair, and anguish of
death row converts who pray for commutation but may be cruelly dis-
appointed. Second, again, were the law to recognize ethical transfor-
mations, Lamberson-like wrongdoers would, at a strategic level, have
two bites at the apple. The first time around they would have an op-
portunity to exhibit remorse at their sentencing hearing. In cases in
which the decisionmaker errs by failing to recognize authentic re-
morse, the Lamberson-like prisoner could then appeal to the mecha-
nisms available to downgrade death sentences.
But perhaps the larger, more principled point here is that a post-
sentencing awakening is far more impressive than merely expressing
preestablished remorse before a judge and jury because it requires a
change in consciousness, often cutting against the wrongdoer's entire
life trajectory. A transformation is a significant moral event that
should not be undervalued based on the somewhat arbitrary time
framework within which the correctional justice system happens to
have caught up with the defendant. If he were more fleet-footed, a
criminal could have outrun the law up until the time at which he ex-
perienced his newfound compassion, and would thereby be, if caught,
advantaged at his sentencing hearing. Slower criminals, more easily
apprehended, have less time to come to the same sorts of moral con-
clusions, not guaranteed by, but often induced through, inevitable
maturity. The difference between the slow and fast criminal is not
morally significant. No clear conceptual rule aligned with retributive
justice nor supported by other values protected by the criminal law
(except, perhaps, the most brutal sort of efficiency) can explain why
capital crimes would be legitimately mitigated at a sentencing hearing,
but not at any time thereafter regardless of the sort of fundamental
shift in character that a prisoner might experience during his incar-
ceration.
doctrine, which holds that "only those who are most deserving of the death penalty are
eligible to receive it").
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D. Addressing Concerns and Counterarguments
The foremost question critics ask when presented with the Trans-
formation Thesis is: How are we supposed to tell the difference be-
tween an authentic conversion and a fraudulent one?2 4 After all, of
the many death row inmates who claim to have found God, some
have, in a meaningful sense, and some have not. Since every "ought"
implies a "can,"25 it is presumptively possible to set up a system that
answers this concern. There is no reason to believe that establishing a
process to verify transformation would be any more difficult than the
establishment of any other legal process that attempts to distinguish
among agents' states of intentionality-56 -such as proving malice
257aforethought in a murder trial, intent in a civil trial,2 or remorse at
See Amitai Etzioni, Introduction to REPENTANCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE I,
9 (Amitai Etzioni & David Carney eds., 1997) ("How can one determine that remorse
is true? Many people, when faced with the apologies of politicians, criminals, and even
friends and spouses, have doubts as to the motivation behind such expressions.").
25 William IK Frankena, Obligation and Ability, in PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS: A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 148, 157 (Max Black ed., 1950) ("[M]any more philoso-
phers... say, in one way or another that 'ought' implies 'can.' Indeed, if there is any-
thing on which philosophers are agreed with plain men and with each other, and
goodness knows there is very little, it is Kant's dictum, 'Du kannst, denn du sollst!"');
see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 341 (1984) ("John Rawls, following
Hart, regards [ought implies can] as the principle of responsibility from which more
particular principles, such as those requiring actions, intentions, or reasons, may be
derived."). See generally ALAN R. WHITE, MODAL THINKING 147-57 (1975) (discussing
the modal verbs "ought" and "can").
2 Admittedly, this is a difficult task. The law requires that we discover a special
sort of ultimately unverifiable knowledge. A previous editor of the Law Review has ex-
plained the tension this way:
First, one has no direct empirical or physical evidence and thus no direct
knowledge of others' internal mental experiences; there is no accurate way,
moreover, to infer such knowledge. (And even if such an inferential method
were proposed, there would be no way to verify it.) Second, the criminal law
and the Model Penal Code require such knowledge.
Adam Candeub, Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2071,
2080-81 (1994). But this is not a problem unique to the Transformation Thesis. It is a
problem of the law generally, id., and a philosophical quandary of other minds, see su-
pra Part I.B (discussing the problem of other minds within the context of character
retributivism).
2 See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1991) (briefly tracing the his-
tory of malice aforethought from England to Philadelphia and then to the state of the
instant matter, Arizona).
See, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955) (discussing the quality of
intent required to find a cause of action for noncriminal battery); see also, e.g., Edging-
ton v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (Ch. 1885) (presuming that states of intentional-
ity are objective and can be known because "the state of a man's mind is as much a fact
as the state of his digestion").
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sentencing.":"' Beyond this, given that the focus of this Comment is to
prove that transfonned death row prisoners should have their sen-
tences commuted, the details of how precisely this is to occur are left
to another day."
The second concern is that the Transformation Thesis may prove
too much. Under the analysis here, a fully transformed prisoner not
only would escape execution, but may be justified in foregoing any
and all state-sanctioned punishment. It must be conceded that this, at
least conceptually, may be true. It is not impossible that, like Saul of
Damascus, even a murderer might, at some point, achieve a level of
ethical awareness and universal love justifying his release from prison
altogether.' But a few caveats are in order. First, this sort of radical
character transformation is eminently rare. 2  Second, if the Trans-
formation Thesis is sound, then perhaps we should not be so afraid of
such an outcome. After all, if Saul of Damascus (later Paul) were
prosecuted for the murder of multiple Christians (Jews at the time) in
modern-day America, he would likely receive the death penalty and
no subsequent religious conversion, with or without God's help,
would commute his sentence. All of us, notjust Protestants, should be
troubled by this. Third, at a specific deterrence level, if all murderers
achieved Buddha-awareness and were freed from prison, it would be
hard to explain how we would be worse off.
On a related note, critics might want to accuse the Transforna-
tion Thesis of accidental overambition. If transformation works to
downgrade desert in the capital context, it ought to work even more
effectively in the noncapital context. To some small extent the critics
would be right. First, however, we should note that we already see this
phenomenon in the status quo. Anne Lamberson, the New York am-
bulance driver, for example, could have been charged with second
degree vehicular manslaughter," calling for a penalty far in excess of
five years parole, t '1 but her remorse seems to have aided in success-
Supra note 143.
"'See supra Part III.C (outlining minor suggestions as to some of the criteria that
might be used by a prison board examining for an authentic death row transforma-
tion).
, Acts 9:1-19 (recounting Saul's conversion to Christianity and God's prohibition
against Saul's imprisonment).
-, Nietzsche, supra note 125, at 48 ("True remorse is rarest among criminals and
comnicts: prisons and penitentiaries are not the breeding places of this gnawver.").
. N.Y PENAL LAw § 125.12 (McKinney 1998); see also id. § 125.15 (indicating that
manslaughter in the second degree only requires reckless behavior).
-,4 Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree is a class D felony, calling for up
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fully pleading to a lower sentence. Thus it appears that the criminal
justice system already incorporates many of the principles advanced
here, and without too much controversy."5 Second, the reason why
the Transformation Thesis is especially effective in the capital context
and less so in other areas of the criminal law is that nowhere else does
retributivism command such a central and near-exclusive role. The
Transformation Thesis, remember, is only effective to the extent re-
tributive justice dictates and controls the terms of punishment. But
other theories of punishment, rehabilitation, and especially deter-
rence, begin to exert increasing influence in much, if not all, of the
remaining areas of criminal law. In other words, even if the Trans-
formation Thesis were effective in downgrading noncapital punish-
ments on retributive grounds, other theories would take up the slack,
continuing to justify sentences in whole or in part. This is why the ar-
guments for transformation are uniquely effective against capital sen-
tences and less so against mere corporal26 ones.
IV. LEGAL RELIEF
Presuming that the Transformation Thesis is firmly grounded in
retributive justice, how might it be implemented into law?26' The ex-
ecutive branch, while sporadically effective, cannot be counted on to
make it work. The judiciary, at some point in the future, could pro-
tect the converted capital prisoner through habeas corpus relief, but
at present is unlikely to do so. The new man's best hope for commu-
tation is original legislation.
A. Executive Clemency
The executive's authority to commute death sentences to life
without the possibility of parole, or any other alternate sentence for
to seven years imprisonment. Id. § 70.00(2) (d). Manslaughter is a class C felony, call-
ing for no more than fifteen years imprisonment. Id. § 70.00(2) (c).
•2 See supra note 143 (discussing the treatment of an expression of remorse shown
by offenders as a mitigating circumstance in most jurisdictions).
2 See supra note 6 (distinguishing between corporal and capital sentences).
267 The following discussion, of course, is relevant only for states sanctioning capital
punishment. To date, only twelve states-Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wis-
consin-have abolished the death penalty. Bonner & Fessenden, supra note 84. In the
remaining states, however, 3682 lives hang in the balance, not an insignificant number.
Sara Rimer, Life After Death Row: For These Men, Sentenced to Death and Then Freed, the
Outside World Has Offered More Misey Than Happiness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, § 6
(Magazine), at 100.
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that matter, is a poor mechanism to implement the thesis advocated
here. Clemency is a broad power that includes pardons, commuta-
tions, and reprieves."; The executive may make all clemency deci-
sions absent any legal--or even internally consistent-standards, has
absolute discretion in its use, and the decisions cannot be reviewed by
any other body."' Thus the first problem is that clemency lacks the
sort of inter-case fairness that we expect from our institutions of
criminal justice. Second, executive clemency is rarely offered and its
use is declining.2"' Third, when it is used, a prisoner's character trans-
formation (often articulated as his having been rehabilitated) is al-
271
most never considered as a primary criterion for commutation.
Many executions have gone ahead despite overwhelming evidence of
a prisoner's transformation. 27' Fourth, because the executive is other-
wise legally unconstrained, clemency decisions are subject to the vaga-
ries of politics.27"f This means that clemency often may be granted
- See Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman
Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REvT. 289, 289 (1993) (explaining that pardons "invalidate
both the guilt and the punishment of the defendant," reprieves "temporarily postpone
the execution," and commutations "reduce the severity of punishment").
-.. See Deborah Leavy, Note, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in
Capital Clemency Proceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889, 891 (1981) ("[E]xecutive authorities to-
day exercise their power virtually free from procedural control by the courts."); see also
Paul Whitlock Cobb, Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99
YALE LJ. 389, 392 (1989) ("At present, of the states with the death penalty, twenty-two
confer an exclusive clemency power on the governor, while fifteen use a pardon board
or other body to check the executive."). In some states, such as Florida, the governor
is not even required to state the precise reasons for clemency. Joseph B. Schimmel,
Commutation of the Death Sentence: Horida Steps Back from Justice and Mercy, 20 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv,. 253, 264 (1992).
,71, See generally Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases,
18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255 (1990-1991) (examining the declining use of
executive clemency in capital cases nationally).
2T" See Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 268, at 303 (indicating that since 1972, of all
capital defendants having had their death sentences commuted through executive
clemency, only one was commuted primarily for reasons having to do with personal
rehabilitation).
^1- For example, despite the near universal sentiment that Karla Faye Tucker "de-
served to have her sentence commuted" based on her religious conversion, Hannity &
Comnes, supra note 227, she was executed. Date with Death: Texas to Snuff out Life of
HublS Killer, EDMONTON SUN, Feb. 23, 2000, at 72.
' "Clemency," as one deputy pardoning attorney puts it, is after all "unavoidably
in some ways a political act." Kevin Krajick, The Quality of Mercy, CORRECrIONS MAG.,
June 1979, at 46, 52. "[, hen the apparent reasons for pardons are sufficiently dis-
liked, the executive may be rebuked-politically, even if not by the courts." Pollack,
supra note 14, at 545 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Graham v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons &
Paroles, 913 S.W.2d 745, 749-50 (Tex. C. App. 1996) (noting that executive clemency
is "notoriously susceptible to abuse by governors" and "greatly affected by public opin-
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where under retributive principles it should not and, conversely,
might not be issued where it clearly should.27' Clemency could, in the
abstract, be used to achieve just deserts for transformed capital of-
fenders,27' but largely due to a lack of consistently applied principled
standards, far too often it is not
2 7
ion and political pressures"); Toney Anaya, Statement by Toney Anaya on Capital Punish-
ment 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 177 (1993) (discussing the politics of executions from his
perspective as Attorney General and former Governor of New Mexico); Bruce Ledewitz
& Scott Staples, The Role of Executive Clementy in Modern Death Penalty Cases, 27 U. RICH.
L. REV. 227 (1993) (discussing governors' political need to be able to explain clemency
decisions to the public); VictoriaJ. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reli-
ance on Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penaly Cases, 49 VAND. L. REX. 311, 349
(1996) (explaining that the foremost reason for the decline in grants of executive
clemency is the political consequences to the executive); Editorial, The Pardons Look
More Sordid, N.Y. TiNIES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A22 (critiquing Bill Clinton's pardon of Marc
Rich as "an inexcusable abuse of the president's absolute clemency power" because
Clinton may have been influenced in his decision by political fimdraising considera-
tions).
274 See, e.g., DEAN MOORE, supra note 33, at 208 (arguing that pardons sometimes
"take into account factors that arose since the case was tried" but that "what the of-
fender deserves is the only consideration that has the moral credentials tojustify grant-
ing or withholding a pardon").
27 An interesting anecdote is KeithJackson's. In September of 1989, this nineteen-
year-old high school student was arrested after selling cocaine in Lafayette Square,
across the street from the White House. Tracy Thompson, D.C. Student Is Given 10
Years in Drug Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1990, at BI1. Under the fairly draconian man-
datory sentencing laws, this first-time offender received a ten-year sentence without the
possibility of parole. Id. District court judge Stanley Sporkin, feeling that the sentence
was enormously excessive, recommended appealing to then-President George H. Bush
for a pardon. Id. But Bush had taken the opportunity ofJackson's arrest and convic-
tion to make a finger-wagging, tough-on-drugs political speech, even going so far as to
use the confiscated cocaine as a visual aid. Judge Sporkin conceded to Jackson:
"[Bush] used you, in the sense of making a big drug speech." Id. Politics can, at times,
soil the more noble aims of executive clemency authority.
276 See Kobil, supra note 98, at 571 ("[Cllemency can be used to achieve justice, by
individualizing sentences and remitting undeserved punishment."). In the case of
Moore v. State, 213 S.E.2d 829 (Ga. 1975), for example, clemency was granted by the
Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles citing William N. Moore's exemplary prison
record, remorse, and religious conversion, among other factors. See Radelet & Zsem-
bik, supra note 268, at 313 (listing the board's factors for commutation).
While governor of California, Pat Brown commuted twenty-three of fifty-nine death
row prisoners. EDMUND G. (PAT) BROWN WIrTH DICK ADLER, PUBLICJUSTICE PRIVATE
MERCY: A GOVERNOR's EDUCATION ON DEATH-Row at xiii (1989). Remorse was an
important factor in Brown's deliberations. Id. at 120.
27 In actual practice clemency is rare, Cobb, supra note 269, at 393 ("The exercise
of executive clemency for capital defendants has fallen into desuetude since the death
penalty was reinstated in the United States by Greggv. Georgia[, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)]."),
and in the post-Furman era, its application is "idiosyncratic at best, and arbitrary at
worst," Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 268, at 305.
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B. Habeas Review
Although the Court has never recognized ethical conversions as
grounds for relief, a reinterpretation of constitutional mandates could
conceivably offer the newly transformed offender some hope. A typi-
cal ethical conversion will take time. Absent a lapse of significant time
between the commission of the crime and the trial,27 s the converted
wrongdoer will be forced to use collateral review as one of the only le-
gal remedies available to him post-transformation. It is controversial• 279
as to whether the Constitution does or should embody moral law, "
but if an agreeable congruence is to be found, habeas review may pro-
vide it.
Briefly, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA") set out new and highly restrictive rules governing habeas
corpus.2 Section 2254 of the amended code mandates that the fed-
eral courts "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus
on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Con-
stitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 281' But further, relief
&' Se, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial
Stratcg, Painoyse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1557, 1572 (1998) (explain-
ing that in one unusual case, the long delay between arrest and trial "provided the de-
fendant with a valuable opportunity to present a convincing 'guilty but redeemed'
case, which is difficult to present credibly when less time has passed between the com-
mission of the crime and the trial" (citation omitted)).
Some scholars argue that the Constitution incorporates moral law. See, e.g.,
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 126-215 (1977) (indicating that the
Constitution incorporates morality, not judges' personal opinions). Some think at-
tempting to interpret moral law from the Constitution is dangerous. See, e.g., Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 467 (1972) (RehnquistJ., dissenting) ("Rigorous attention to
the limits of this Court's authority is likewise enjoined because of the natural desire
that beguiles judges along with other human beings into imposing their own views of
goodness, truth, and justice upon others."); Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About
Natural Law, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2393, 2409 (1992) (asking the question central to Sena-
tor Biden's inquiries at Clarence Thomas's confirmation hearings: "Can the judge, if
she thinks the law sufficiently immoral, substitute her views for the legal mandate?").
- Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S.
651 (1996) (discussing the AEDPA in the context of the history of habeas corpus and
finding that the AEDPA does not violate article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution
or the Constitution's ban on suspension of the writ pursuant to article I, section 9,
clause 2).
-" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994). See generally id. § 2261 (Supp. IV 1998) (prescribing
a capital offender's appeal due to appointment of counsel); id. § 2262 (prescribing
mandatory sta)s of execution, describing the duration of and limits on stays of execu-
tion, and discussing the availability of successive petitions); id § 2263 (describing the
time requirements for the filing of habeas corpus applications and the tolling rules);
id. § 2264 (delineating the scope of federal review and district court adjudication); id.
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may be granted only where incarceration was a result of a "decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States."282 Review of federal decisions.. is no less restric-
tive, utilizing the same standard as articulated under § 2254.2"4 Thus,
only those constitutional rights clearly delineated by the Supreme
Court may provide grounds for habeas relief2.8 The Eighth Amend-
ment, arguably, is one of those rights.
"The Eighth Amendment, which applies against the States by vir-
tue of the Fourteenth Amendment,"286 provides that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted."2 87 The Court has held over the years, in
Ford, Gregg, Trop, and Weems, that this proscription is not static but
288
rather reflects evolving standards of decency. In this context, the
Court examined the issue of proportionality, determining whether the
penalty ascribed was appropriate for the crime committed."q In gen-
§ 2265 (delineating the application to state unitary review procedure); id. § 2266 (lim-
iting the periods for determining applications and motions).
2 2 Id. § 2254(d) (1).
2,3 A motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence brought under § 2255, al-
though similar in many ways, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. United
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 220 (1952). Section 2255 is rather a statutory supple-
ment to writ. In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 925 (6th Cir. 1997). Congress enacted
§ 2255 "to allow the court that imposed [the] sentence, rather than a court that hap-
pened to be near a prison [in which the person was incarcerated], to hear a collateral
attack on that sentence." Id.
2" Although technically different, the standard for relief between § 2254 and
§ 2255 is identical. A § 2255 motion is the federal equivalent of a state habeas petition
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and is intended to mirror § 2254 in operative effect.
Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 353-54 (1994). Thus, precedent under § 2254 and § 2255
may be used interchangeably. See, e.g., United States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 323, 327 (3d
Cir. 1994) (applying precedent under § 2254 to a § 2255 proceeding); United States v.
Gutierrez, 839 F.2d 648, 650 (10th Cir. 1988) (same).
2 See Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[A] writ may issue
only when the state court decision is 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of,' an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court."); Bocian v. Godinez, 101
F.3d 465, 471 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Federal Courts are no longer permitted to apply their
own jurisprudence, but must look exclusively to Supreme Court caselaw.").
286 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962 (1991) (citation omitted).
2s7 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
171 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
28 See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371-72 (1982) (discussing whether the lower
court was correct in finding that possession with intent to sell a small amount of mary
jane justified a forty-year prison sentence and a $20,000 fine).
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eral, the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee"
An exception is made, however, in the analysis of capital penalties.
The Supreme Court first found in Coker v. Georgia that "a sentence of
death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as
cruel and unusual punishment."29' Five years later the Court held that
imposing the death penalty upon a participant in a felony murder
without any inquiry into the participant's intent to kill likewise violates
the Eighth Amendment under the doctrine of proportionality. In
Rummel the Court established that Eighth Amendment proportionality
analysis is unique to the review of capital cases,'" and in Harmelin it
"reassert[ed]" that proposition.04 The Court spoke clearly on this is-
sue: "Proportionality review is one of several respects in which we
have held that 'death is different,' and have imposed protections that
the Constitution nowhere else provides."95
An untested application of the proportionality doctrine wed to the
Transformation Thesis might argue as follows. Whereas the capital
prisoner may have deserved the death penalty at one time, for the
newly transformed, this is no longer true. Proportionality, as dis-
cussed above in greater length, is determined by properly matching
the prisoner's desert with his punishment.2 6 The wrongdoer has
downgraded his desert first by changing his moral identity, by trans-
207forming into the new man. Second, through the remorse and pen-
ance, the new man has displaced and transformed his desert, and
"' See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (finding that the setting aside of a conviction based
on proportionality analysis in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), "was simply wrong").
" 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982); cf Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
158 (1987) (using a proportionality analysis to conclude that the Eighth Amendment
does not prohibit imposing the death penalty where the defendant is a major part of a
felony murder, and whose mental state is one of reckless indifference).
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
"' Hannelin, 501 U.S. at 994.
Id.; see also, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (providing special
protection against ajury's racial bias in capital trials); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 117 (1982) (requiring reviewing courts to examine all mitigating evidence); Beck
v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980) (advancing a unique rule for capital trials,
namely, that the sentence of death may not be constitutionally imposed "after a jury
verdict of guilt of a capital offense, when the jury was not permitted to consider a ver-
dict of guilt of a lesser included non-capital offense, and when the evidence would
have supported such a verdict").
See supra Part IA (discussing how proportionality doctrine affects punishment).
See supra Part III.A (discussing how the new man is transformed into another
person entirely).
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joined the moral community as an autonomous human being.2  And
last, since it can no longer be said that the transformed prisoner has
committed the ultimate crime-unremorseful, cold-blooded inten-
tional murder-he does not deserve the ultimate punishment.'2' For
all these reasons, the sentence of death no longer stands in proper
proportion to the desert emanating from the prisoner and his crime.
Unfortunately, based on the Court's existing doctrine, this argu-
ment suffers from insuperable difficulties. The Supreme Court has
never found a post hoc ethical transformation to be sufficient grounds
for habeas relief, under proportionality or any other doctrine. Nor
has the Court ever held remorse, penance, or character transforma-
tion to be cognizable habeas corpus claims. Further, habeas corpus
relief traditionally has been granted only upon the finding of some
error in the trial itself °00 Structural error, as such trial error has been
called, is a "defect affecting the framework within which the trial pro-
ceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process."'M Habeas re-
lief may be granted only in cases in which the constitutional claims of
trial error resulted in "actual prejudice." ° No mention is made of af-
" See supra Part III.B (discussing how remorse and penance displace and barter
away desert).
See supra Part III.C (discussing how the penultimate crime cannot justify the ul-
timate sanction).
See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) (indicating that struc-
tural error requires automatic reversal of conviction); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 21-22 (1967) (same).
301 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); see also, e.g., Brecht, 507 U.S. at
630 (explaining that structural errors "infect the entire trial process"); McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984) (finding structural error where there is a viola-
tion of the right to self-representation at trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344-45 (1963) (finding structural error where there is deprivation of the right to coun-
sel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-32 (1927) (determining that trial by a biased
judge creates structural error); United States v. Iribe-Perez, 129 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th
Cir. 1997) (finding error where the trial judge informed a jury panel that the defen-
dant would be pleading guilty and then failed to remove those panelists from the jury
pool when the defendant changed his mind); Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234, 1237-
38 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding error in the denial of the right to be informed of the na-
ture and cause of criminal accusation).
Structural error is contrasted against harmless error, which does not require rever-
sal. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22 (indicating that nonreversible errors are those "which in
the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, con-
sistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the auto-
matic reversal of the conviction").
:.2 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449
(1986)); see also, e.g., Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-11 (holding that a coerced confession
is an issue to be reviewed under the harmless error standard); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486
U.S. 249, 256-58 (1988) (reviewing the admission of psychiatric testimony under the
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ter-the-fact error, as it might be called, where the new man who once
desened his punishment now does not.
In response, it may be argued that, while the Court has never
predicated a grant of habeas relief on character conversion, it has de-
termined that violations of the proportionality doctrine within the
capital context are constitutional violations. The Court's silence
here does not create a bar for the logical and ethically mandated ex-
tension of proportionality under the authority of transformative char-
acter theory. This follows not only from the precepts of character re-
tributhism, which is the only theory of punishment that supports and
makes sense of notions of proportionality in the first place, but also
from Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence, which delim-
its capital sentences in such a way as to preclude them from extending
to mere penultimate agglomerations of desert. It must be conceded,
however, that the Court has not spoken with any real specificity on
this issue. ""4 But at the very least, the door is still open, even under the
highly restrictive AEDPA rules, for the Supreme Court explicitly to
find character conversion a proper predicate for habeas corpus relief
under the Eighth Amendment's proportionality doctrine.0°  The
Court clearly may do so under the analysis articulated here.3 " Were
the Court to carve out a special exception in this respect for capital
prisoners, it would not be the first time that the Court has recognized
that "death is different."
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harmless error standard); Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 425 n.21 (1987) (con-
sidering the use of psychological evaluations at trial according to the harmless error
standard); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (reviewing identification testi-
mony admitted without counsel present); Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d. 1472, 1478 (9th Cir.
1995) (applying the harmless error standard to trial testimony read back to the jury
outside of the defendant's presence).
I,, See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is
disproportionate to the crime of rape).
J 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1) (Supp. IV 1998) (indicating that lower courts may not
provide relief unless under authority of a "clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States").
" -The true Eighth Amendment value applicable to the selection process in capi-
tal cases, of course, is that only defendants who deserve the death penalty should re-
ceive that sanction." Howe, supra note 28, at 857 n.244. Negative retributive justice
thus motivates the Eighth Amendment and explains the importance of the propor-
tionality doctrine in this area.
"' See supra Part III (arguing that transformation is sufficient justification to down-
grade desert and that under such circumstances proportionality mandates the allevia-
tion of the death sentence).
'7 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991). Where the death penalty is
involved, the Court has typically demanded heightened reliability in conviction deci-
sions. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (invalidating a death sen-
tence as violative of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury where a black de-
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Thus, habeas corpus is a viable, although at present, exceedingly
unlikely, avenue for relief. Currently, the best strategy still involves
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.' 8 Concomitant claims, as
discussed here, might still be brought so that the issue would be pre-
served upon a writ of certiorari, and the Court could reconsider the
Eighth Amendment analysis under a more clearly fleshed out analysis
of proportionality, if not the quickly shifting standards of decency.
C. Original Legislation
The third branch of government, at the federal or state level,
should act where the other two have failed. Legislation that protects
the ethically transformed from execution might involve a tribunal,
much like a parole or executive clemency board," reviewing evidence
from the prisoner and others and determining whether an authentic
ethical conversion has, in fact, taken place. The Transformation
Board should be composed of individuals skilled in distinguishing real
transformations from fake ones. The Board might very well model
some of its procedures after those used in sentencing hearings, since
the goal of considering mitigating and aggravating evidence is present
in the two contexts. The two most important values in this decision
process are accuracy and efficiency.
Of course, for the appellant, much is at stake, but endless and
groundless appeals would mock the system and expend finite re-
sources. Thus, for the sake of efficiency, after a prisoner receives a
negative decision from the Board, he should first be required to wait
at least a full year before re-applying for consideration. But, second,
for the sake of accuracy, all prisoners within one week of execution
fendant charged with an interracial crime was not allowed to question potential jurors
about their racial prejudices); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (invalidat-
ing a death sentence under the Due Process Clause because the state jury was not
permitted to consider a verdict of guilt on a lesser included offense); Gardner v. Flor-
ida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-62 (1977) (invalidating a death sentence under the Due Process
Clause based on the failure to reveal to defense counsel a pre-sentence report on
which the sentencing judge purported to rely).
3e See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting out the general
standards for determining ineffective assistance of counsel).
" A number of states have clemency boards. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. VII, § 1;
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4302 (1999) (Board of Pardons); LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; Lt.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 572-574 (West 1992) (Board of Pardons); OKLA. CONsT. art. VI,
§ 10; OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 332, 332.1, 332.2 (West 1991) (Pardon and Parole
Board); PA. CONsT. art. IV, § 9; 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 113 (West 2000) (Board of
Pardons); TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 11; TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 48.01 (2000)
(Board of Pardons and Paroles).
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should be re-evaluated regardless of the timing of their last review.
Third, because the process described here should not be used as an-
other mechanism with which to stall the commission of ajustified and
constitutional capital sentence, condemned prisoners should be per-
mitted to appeal to the Transformation Board only as time allows.
Exempting the "last week review," no Board action shall otherwise stall
the running of the prisoner's clock toward his execution date.
Fourth, in order to make the prisoner's appeal meaningful within his
limited time frame, the Board should make all decisions within one
year of application for relief. Fifth, the Board should have authority
within the "last week review" period to stay the execution long enough
to come to a reasoned and informed decision as to the prisoner's state
of transformation. But last, the Board's authority to stay-in the exer-
cise of accuracy-shall itself be checked-in the interest of effi-
ciency-by the court for abuse of discretion.
Ascertaining the sincerity of an individual who has nothing to lose
and his life to gain simply by lying about the contents of his con-
science is an exceedingly difficult task. The goal of this Comment is
normative in nature. How to formulate and implement a policy to sat-
isfy these moral claims is complex and beyond my central scope. That
said, a few facial indicators of character transformation, associated
remorse, and the penance that tends to distinguish metamorphosis
from mendacity, come to mind. What follows is a nonexhaustive list
of empirically or inferentially observable characteristics of the ethi-
cally transformed.
First, the transformed will admit fully his culpability.30  Second,
the transformed will be empty of all proffered excuses.31 Third, the
wrongdoer will show proof of having internalized his sense of respon-
sibility. It is common for the converted to experience tangible and
"" A letter written by a sincerely penitent prisoner on death row is instructive here.
He is unreserved in his admission of guilt: "I did it, I am guilty, and I am sorry."
Anonymous, Remorse, in WELCOME TO HELL: LETrERS AND WRITINGS FROM DEATH
Row 208, 209 (Jan Arriens ed., 1997); see also Brett, supra note 43, at 90-91 (indicating
that remorse is to be conceptualized in terms of acceptance of responsibility); Sundby,
supra note 278, at 1590 (same).
,U The letter writer repeatedly reiterated, "none of what I say is intended as an 'ex-
cuse.'" Anonymous, supra note 310, at 212. Juries understand this principle; as one
scholar advising attorneys trying capital murders has said, "[elverything is lost if the
jury (havingjust convicted the defendant of murder) interprets the use of mitigating
material as an attempt to excuse the murder or evade responsibility." James M. Doyle,
't, Laus'ers' Art: "Representation" in Capital Cases, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417, 439
(1996).
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daily emotional pain over the wrong committed. 2 Fourth, the pris-
oner will exhibit a sincere desire to undo what he has done3 1 3 and will
appreciate fully the harm wrought so as to avoid shallow remorse.314
Fifth, an individual who has experienced an authentic ethical trans-
formation will vow never to repeat the wrongdoing. Sixth, there
may be some extrinsic proof of shift in the prisoner's character orien-
tation, his gestalt logic, from one philosophical perspective to an-
other. 6 This shift may manifest itself in ways as simple as mere po-
liteness, exhibitions of compassion, or genuine (in contrast to
technical) religiosity. Last, it may be a useful heuristic to think of the
prisoner's character like a character in a novel. Does it cohere? Does
it make sense? Are his motivations credible, or do they appear con-
trived, mechanical, flat, containing unexplained gaps? The authentic
transformation may distinguish itself from mere artifice through ref-
erence to these guidelines.
CONCLUSION
Emotional epistemology teaches us not only that a wrongdoer's
guilt and/or remorse may be indicative of his culpability, but because
remorse functions like gold in a bathtub, it may also help to alleviate
desert. Alternate perspectives on the same phenomenon tell a differ-
ent story with the same ending: in concert, remorse and penance
confer the power to transform the criminal's heavy and toxic load of
coal-like desert into the lighter, nontoxic, and far more valuable dia-
mond-like virtue-a valuable commodity in the normative economy.
The ethical transformation can provide the basis for at least three
strong arguments for why a deserved death penalty should be down-
312 "There is not a day that goes by that I don't feel and agonize under the im-
mensely heavy burden of what I have done." Anonymous, supra note 310, at 209.
3 See, e.g., id. at 209 ("As God Almighty is my witness I swear to you, if my execu-
tion would bring your Grandpa back to life, I would willingly drop all my appeals this
instant."); see also HABER, supra note 137, at 90 (indicating that regret, or wishing that
the wrong had not been done, is an aspect of repentance).
314 The letter writer explains that the photographs in his prison cell of the tomb-
stones of those he has killed serve to remind him "of the true magnitude of what [he
has] done and what [he has] taken from others." Anonymous, supra note 310, at 216.
315 See HABER, supra note 137, at 90 (describing a wrongdoer's change of heart,
"metanoia," as involving repentance, which itself entails a vow to abstain from future
wrongdoing); see also GRINBERG, supra note 11, at 47 (noting that feelings of guilt tend
to "have an inhibiting effect on the expression of hostile tendencies").
16 See HABER, supra note 137, at 98 (indicating that when a wrongdoer repents he
becomes a new person subscribing to a new "moral principle that the old person does
not" subscribe to and thereby "denies identity with the wrongdoer").
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graded to a lesser sentence. First, the new man is ontologically differ-
ent from the wrongdoer who committed the original crime. A certain
amount of desert is lost or metabolized in the character shift from a
darker form to a lighter one. Second, the combination of remorse
and penance affects desert through a psychological and spiritual bar-
ter system that at first exacts a toll on the prisoner, militating against
desert, but then, in its last stage, moves beyond mere suffering into
human dignity. Third, where the new man achieves a state of mere
penultimate desert, we can no longer, in good conscience, enforce
the ultimate sanction, under the principles of the only theory of pun-
ishment that justifies capital sentencing in the first place: retributive
justice. These are the ways in which an authentic shift in a convict's
ethical perspective defeats retributive justifications for the imposition
of the death penalty upon culpable (in the sense of having the requi-
site mens rea and actus reus), but transformed, wrongdoers.
The themes of redemption, rebirth, and renewal are arguably just
as important to us as notions of responsibility and strict, unflinching,
unmitigated desert.1 7 We believe in responsibility because we want to
take the dignity of the individual seriously: But there are special oc-
casions, such as the ones discussed here, when redemption, far from
existing in tension with values of personal accountability, actually
augments and compliments those values. Moreover, redemption of-
fers certain benefits that unsophisticated notions of responsibility,
alone, cannot. With redemption there is hope that the worst of us can
become better, that evil acts need not have an ineluctable and perma-
nent hold upon the life of the actor, and that it is never too late to
sweep away past mistakes and try again to be all the things that at an
earlier time we hoped we could be. If there is any "getting even" for a
murder, it is in turning a black act into an opportunity to expand and
reaffirm the moral community. A personal resurrection implicates all
of these possibilities. Perhaps most importantly, the wisdom of the old
adage, there but for the grate of God go I, exposes the fundamental
,17 S'e Sundby, supra note 278, at 1557 (suggesting that few notions "reverberate at
the core of the human psyche as strongly" as those of redemption, expatiation, and
absolution).
"' See van den Haag, supra note 29, at 1669 (noting the arguments of various phi-
losophers that "execution, when deserved, is required for the sake of the convict's dig-
nity").
"" On seeing several criminals being led to the scaffold in the 16th century,
English Protestant martyTJohn Bradford remarked: "There, but for the grace
of God, goesJohn Bradford." His words, without his name, are still very com-
mon ones today for expressing one's blessings compared to the fate of an-
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soundness of always leaving the door ajar for transformation. To re-
gard some as separate from ourselves, as outside of the human family,
as having no possibility of ever redeeming themselves, is to flirt with
the danger of eroding the unity that gives such a family its cohesive
force, its power to confer meaningful identity upon its brethren, and
its moral authority to obligate peace and accord.
other. Bradford was later burned at the stake as a heretic.
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